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My study investigates the determinants of executive stock option grants.  I also 
examine how executive stock option grants are associated with firm performance in the 
presence of these determinants.  I extend and compare the results of Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) and Zhou (2001) by adopting both cross-sectional and panel data specification 
models (with fixed firm and industry effects).  For robustness, I also adopt 
instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of the compensation variables.  
To investigate the determinants of executive stock option grants, my study tests 
hypotheses concerning value enhancement, risk taking, tax saving, signalling and cash 
conservation motivation for executive stock option grants.  My findings show that 
executive stock option grants are endogenously determined by the firm’s contracting 
environment, with value enhancement and signalling motivation being statistically 
significant in my data.  Results for the value enhancement motivation support agency 
theory in that firms grant stock options to provide more incentives to executives.  On 
the other hand, results for the signalling motivation show that firms grant executives 
more stock options to signal positive price sensitive information.  
Controlling for endogeneity, my results show an equilibrium functional form of 
executive stock option grants and firm performance that is U-shaped.  This U-shaped 
function suggests that firms granting either few or many executive stock options are 
associated with high performance.  The results imply that executive stock option grants 
may not always be the best compensation tool for all companies.  However, agency 
theory is important because consistent with the prediction of principal-agent model, 
executive stock option grants are explained by the key variables in the contracting 
environment (Himmelberg et al. (1999)).  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This study is motivated by the literature on managerial stock ownership.  
Literature has shown that managerial stock ownership is associated with firm 
performance (for example, Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990)).  
Studies have also found that managerial stock ownership is endogenously determined 
by factors in the contracting environment (for example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Himmelberg et al. (1999)).  Due to the observable and unobservable differences in the 
environment, firms face different levels of agency problem.  They adopt levels of 
managerial stock ownership to suit their contracting environment in ways consistent 
with the predictions of the principal-agent model (Himmelberg et al. (1999)).  
Controlling for the problem of endogeneity of the managerial stock ownership 
variable, Himmelberg et al. (1999) find no econometric relation between managerial 
stock ownership and firm performance. 
In this study, I focus on a popular form of executive compensation – stock 
options.1  Executive stock option grants are linked to managerial stock ownership 
when managers exercise their stock options to purchase company shares.  However, 
managers can easily severe this link by cashing out on the options.  Besides, executive 
stock option grants differ from managerial stock ownership in their incentive 
alignment objectives.  First, executive stock option holders enjoy only share price 
                                                 
1 Over the years, stock options have emerged as the single largest component of executive compensation 
in the U.S. (Hall and Liebman (1998) and Murphy (1999)). Data also shows that more firms are granting 
executive stock options. Statistics from the Compustat’s Execucomp database have shown that in the 
year 2001, 80% of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms have granted stock options to their top 
executives, as compared to 62% in the year 1992. In addition, the value of executive stock options 
accounted for 54% of the total pay for the S&P’s 500 top executives in the year 2001, which is an 
increase from the 34% in the year 1992. 
 
The Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants and the Link Between Executive Stock Option 
Grants and Firm Performance.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 2 
appreciation and not total shareholder returns that include dividends.  Second, stock 
options lose incentive value once the share price drops significantly below the exercise 
price.  Third, executive stock option holders are motivated to make risky investment 
since the value of stock options increases with the volatility of share price.2 
Given the foregoing, it is interesting to investigate the link between executive 
stock option grants and firm performance, and whether this relation differs from that 
found in the literature on the relationship between managerial stock ownership and 
firm performance.  As theoretical and empirical literature has pointed to the 
endogenous nature of all compensation variables, this study will first examine how 
executive stock option grants are endogenously determined.  To do this, I identify the 
following determinants of executive stock option grants from past studies – value 
enhancement, risk taking, tax saving, signalling and cash conservation.  
Zhou (2001) argues that cross-sectional rather than panel data specification is 
more appropriate in capturing any meaningful relationship between managerial stock 
ownership and firm performance.  My study adopts both cross-sectional and panel data 
specifications.  I seek to determine if any single model is more suitable in documenting 
the executive stock option grants and firm performance relationship.  For robustness, 
my study also uses both cumulative (i.e. past and current) as well as single year 
executive stock option grants as proxies for my option grant variable.   
With the exception of studies such as Bizjak et al. (1993), Palia (1998) and 
Core and Guay (1999), previous studies have typically associated managerial stock 
ownership with firm performance without considering executive stock option grants.  
                                                 
2 According to the Black Scholes’ (1973) option pricing model, firm volatility (risk) has a positive effect 
on option price. 
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Zhou (2001) argues that the role of managerial stock ownership and executive stock 
option grants is complex, and neither can by itself be a good proxy for total equity 
incentives.  For completeness, my study also examines total equity grants (defined as 
stock and stock option grants).   
 
1.1 Contribution of Study 
There are two key contributions in this study: the investigation of executive 
stock option grants, and the investigation of the type of specification model suitable for 
analysis of executive stock option grants. 
Studies such as Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) report a 
non-monotonic and inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial stock 
ownership and firm performance respectively.  On the other hand, a more recent study 
by Himmelberg et al. (1999) reports no such relationship after controlling for the 
endogeneity of the managerial stock ownership variable.  Despite these empirical 
studies on managerial stock ownership, there has been no study to date that examines 
the functional form of the relationship between executive stock option grants and firm 
performance.  Therefore, my study attempts to investigate this relationship, by 
regressing firm performance on executive stock option grants after separating the 
determinants of executive stock option grants.  The functional form of the relationship 
provides insights pertaining to the question of how executive stock option grants 
benefit shareholders.  
Earlier studies such as Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck et al. (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) perform analyses of managerial stock ownership on 
cross-sectional data.  However, Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that panel data, 
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combined with fixed firm effects, is more appropriate for such analyses.  This is 
because panel data with fixed effects controls for the endogeneity of the managerial 
stock ownership variable.  On the other hand, Zhou (2001) disagrees with Himmelberg 
et al. (1999) as he argues that cross-sectional rather than panel data specification is 
more appropriate in capturing any meaningful relationship between managerial stock 
ownership and firm performance.  Given the controversy in the type of specification to 
use for the analys is of managerial stock ownership, my study seeks to determine if any 
single specification is more suitable in documenting the executive stock option grants 
and firm performance relationship.  I use both cross-sectional and panel data in my 
analysis of executive stock option grants.  My results provide empirical evidence on 
the suitability of each model in testing any executive stock option grants relationship.  
This has implications for the appropriate model for tests on executive stock option 
grants that future studies should adopt.   
 
1.2 Structure of Study 
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses and Chapter 4 describes the methodology 
and data.  Chapter 5 presents the analyses and findings.  Finally, Chapter 6 concludes 
and discusses the implications for future studies. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 The chapter is presented in three main sections.  Section 2.1 provides a review 
of the potential determinants of executive stock option grants.  Section 2.2 focuses on 
the relationship between managerial stock ownership and firm performance.  Finally, 
Section 2.3 reviews the studies that consider both managerial stock ownership and 
executive stock option grants. 
 
2.1 Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants 
 
In this section, I review studies that investigate the determinants of executive 
stock option grants.  I focus on the following few potential determinants – value 
enhancement, risk taking, tax savings, signalling and cash conservation.3  
 
2.1.1 Value Enhancement 
One benefit of executive stock option grants is the alignment of executives and 
shareholders’ interest.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) first hypothesised the incentive 
alignment argument, which states that compensation plans reduce agency costs in a 
firm.4  Haugen and Senbet (1981) provide support for this hypothesis when they show 
that executives can be encouraged to maximise firm resources if a portion of their 
                                                 
3 As reported by Ittner et al. (2003), one popular motivation for firms to adopt executive stock option 
grants is the reduction in staff turnover. However, my study does not include this motivation for the 
following reason. Ittner et al. (2003) find little evidence that supports the claim that the motivation to 
reduce staff turnover is an important driver of equity-based compensation in the new economy firms. 
This is contrary to the belief that the staff attraction and retention benefits of executive stock options are 
particularly important in the new economy companies, which are typically faced with tight labour 
markets. Unlike Ittner et al. (2003), my study examines a broad spectrum of firms, and thus this 
motivation may be less relevant compared to Ittner et al. (2003) that focuses on the new economy firms. 
 
4 Agency costs is the cost of deviation from value-maximisation of a firm.  
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wealth is tied to firm performance through executive stock option grants.  Executives’ 
wealth is tied to firm performance through the following four unique features of 
executive stock options.  First, the stock option’s payoff is a convex function of stock 
performance.  Second, executives generally have to hold their stock options for a 
specified period of time before the options vest.  Third, executives cannot sell their 
options.  Fourth, executives must typically exercise or forfeit their options shortly after 
leaving the company.  
Empirical studies such as Tehranian and Waegelein (1985), Brickley et al. 
(1985), DeFusco et al. (1990) and Yermack (1997) use the event study methodology to 
support the value enhancement benefits of compensation contracts.  These studies 
observe stock price reactions to announcements and changes of compensation plans.  
Under the efficient market hypothesis, any increase in the value enhancement 
incentives through introduction or increase in executive stock option grants will be 
incorporated into stock prices upon announcement.  Brickley et al. (1985) examine 
stock price reactions to announcement of proposed changes in long-term executive 
compensation plans.  They study the following five types of long-term compensation 
plans: stock options, stock appreciation rights, restricted stock, phantom stock and 
performance plans.  They document positive abnormal returns on firms adopting these 
compensation plans.  Their finding is consistent with the contention that compensation 
plans encourage executives to enhance firm value. 
On the other hand, the risk aversion argument counteracts the value 
enhancement benefits of executive stock option grants.  As large executive stock 
option grants imply less portfolio diversification for an executive, the larger the 
executive stock option grants, the more risk averse an executive gets.  This is 
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especially so if the firm’s risk is high because diversification is costly.  Lewellen et al. 
(1985) and Lewellen et al. (1987) support this argument when they find that executives 
with equity grants in firms have higher exposure to undiversifiable firm risk.  These 
executives tend to shun risk and in the process, may forego potentially higher returns 
for the firm.5 
From the literature, I expect the optimal compensation contract to involve a 
tradeoff between incentives for performance and managerial risk aversion.  The next 
sub-section discusses the risk taking motivation for executive stock option grants.   
 
2.1.2 Risk Taking  
As defined by Black and Scholes’ (1973) option pricing model, option value 
increases with firm volatility (firm risk).  This model motivates a series of studies that 
further develop the theory that executive stock option grants encourage risk taking.  
For instance, Haugen and Senbet (1981) argue that executive stock option grants 
induce risk taking behaviour in executives who would otherwise shun risky projects.  
The benefits of executive stock option grants could compensate these executives for 
taking additional risk. 
In another study on the risk taking motivation for executive stock option grants, 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) examine the relationship between executive stock 
option grants and the characteristics of investment decisions made by the firm. 6  They 
posit that the risk taking motivation may not be obvious because of two opposing 
                                                 
5 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) offer an alternative interpretation to the incentives and risk arguments. They 
argue that firm risk offers scope for managerial discretion and high-risk firms require high level of 
equity ownership in an optimal contract.  
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arguments.  First, as indicated by the Black and Scholes’ (1973) model, increasing firm 
volatility increases the value of stock options.  Second, increasing firm volatility 
reduces certainty in the executive’s stream of employment income.7  Despite these 
contradicting effects, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) conclude that the first argument 
is likely to dominate for executives with high executive stock option grants.  The 
reason is that these executives are induced to choose variance- increasing corporate 
investments, which are typically more risky. 
Research using event study analysis has also documented the risk taking 
motivation for executive stock option grants.  For example, Defusco et al. (1990) find 
a significant increase in stock and stock return volatility following announcements of 
adoption of executive stock option plans.  This reinforces the theory that executive 
stock option grants induce risk taking behaviour.  In addition, the study documents an 
increase in shareholder wealth and a decrease in bondholder wealth.  These findings 
are consistent with the rational investors reacting to the anticipated risk taking 
behaviour of executives with stock option grants. 
The risk taking argument extends further to Research and Development (R&D) 
spending.  Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that the more stock options a CEO owns, the 
less likely he is to reduce the firm’s R&D spending during his final term in the office.  
High R&D spending is typically associated with high risk, which would increase 
option value.  Therefore, a CEO who is leaving the firm will be induced to maximise 
the potential compensation rewards, which he may receive if he cashes out his stock 
                                                                                                                                             
6 The study examines 3 types of investment decisions: acquisitions by mergers, acquisitions by tender 
offers and divestitures by sell-offs. It discusses the impact that the risk taking motivation of stock option 
grants has on investment decisions. 
 
7 As the cash flow in a firm becomes uncertain, executive’s compensation in the firm may be reduced. In 
the worst scenario, retrenchment may occur. 
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options, by spending generously on R&D.  This is especially so if the stock options are 
mostly vestable during the CEO’s final year in the office. 
Other empirical studies that investigate the relationship between options and 
risk include Tufano (1996), Schrand and Unal (1998) and Rajgopal and Shevlin 
(2002).  Tufano (1996) investigates the hedging policies of gold producers.  He finds 
that firms whose managers hold more options  better manage gold price risk than firms 
whose managers hold more stock.  Studies by Schrand and Unal (1998) and Rajgopal 
and Shevlin (2002) examine thrifts converting to stock ownership, and the oil and gas 
exploration risk respectively.  These studies report similar findings. 
 
2.1.3 Tax Savings  
Firms may grant executive stock options to enjoy tax benefits (Hite and Long 
(1982)).  Stock options granted at-the-money are typically not taxed to the employee or 
expensed for the firm at the time of grant.8  As a result of these tax and accounting 
rules, researchers argue that firms should grant more stock options in periods when tax 
rates are low (for example, Yermack (1995), Core and Guay (1999, 2001) and Ittner et 
al. (2003)).  
Yermack (1995) suggests that firms with tax loss carry-forwards are more 
likely to award stock options as these firms are likely to receive a lower marginal tax 
                                                                                                                                             
 
8 Under APB No. 25 “Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees”, firms disclose in their notes the 
effects of fair value accounting of employee stock options on reported earnings and earnings per share. 
This is contrary to SFAS 123 “Accounting for Stock-Based Comp ensation”, which encourages firms to 
expense off the fair value of employee stock options at the grant date. As almost all firms apply APB 25 
accounting with note disclosure, the recognised employee stock option compensation expense is zero for 
most firms (Hanlon and Shevlin (2001)). In addition, firms granting nonqualified stock options enjoy a 
tax deduction equal to the intrinsic value of the options on the exercise date. However, firms receive no 
tax benefit with qualified stock options.  
 
 
The Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants and the Link Between Executive Stock Option 
Grants and Firm Performance. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 10 
deduction from cash compensation.  However, his results are mainly insignificant.  
Core and Guay (2001) adopt marginal tax rate as a potential determinant of executive 
stock option grants.  Similar to Yermack (1995), they find that the effects of tax 
benefits of stock options are limited.  In contrast to these findings, a recent study by 
Ittner et al. (2003) find that stock option grants to non-executive employers are 
significantly lower for new economy firms with high marginal tax rates.  This provides 
evidence that firms grant fewer stock options to enjoy tax benefits from other 
compensation mechanisms. 
 
2.1.4 Signalling  
Signalling theory states that the adoption of executive stock option grants 
signals favourable insider information about the firm.  Executive stock option grants, 
being costly, can be a credible signal to investors.  Besides, the grant is also a low-risk 
means for executives to capitalise on the expected investors’ reactions to favourable 
corporate news.  Hence, the signalling argument suggests that firms grant executive 
stock options when there is favourable information.  Yermack (1997) provides 
empirical evidence for this argument when he investigates the timing of CEO stock 
option awards.  He observes that option awards tend to occur together with positive 
stock price movements.  This suggests that the executives who are aware of the firm’s 
future profits may influence their compensation committees to award more stock 
options.  As a result, firms grant executives stock options shortly before the release of 
favourable corporate news.   
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2.1.5 Cash Conservation  
Unlike other forms of compensation such as salary and annual bonuses, 
executive stock options do not require firms to make immediate cash payout.  As a 
result, firms experiencing cash flow problems are expected to rely heavily on stock 
options as a form of executive compensation as a way to conserve cash (for example, 
Yermack (1995), Core and Guay (1999, 2001) and Ittner et al. (2003)).  This is also 
known as the substitution hypothesis, where the low performance firms (for example, 
the young start-ups) are expected to substitute executive stock options for cash. 
Yermack (1995) finds a significant “cash conservation” motivation in executive 
stock option grants.  His results show that the ratio of stock option grants to cash 
compensation almost doubles in firms that are deemed to face liquidity constraints.  
Corresponding to Yermak (1995)’s results, Core and Guay (2001) report strong 
evidence that cash constrained firms use equity grants in place of cash compensation.  
However, in contrast to the preceding studies and popular belief, Ittner et al. (2003) 
find no evidence that cash constrained new economy firms rely on stock options to 
conserve cash.  
 
2.2 Relationship between Managerial Stock Ownership and Firm 
Performance 
 
Given that my study of the relationship between executive stock option grants 
and firm performance is motivated by the literature on the relationship between 
managerial stock ownership and firm performance, I review the literature on the latter 
here. 
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2.2.1 Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence 
The literature on the relationship between managerial stock ownership and firm 
performance is built on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).  However, as 
highlighted by Morck et al. (1988), theoretical arguments alone cannot unambiguously 
predict the relationship between managerial stock ownership and firm performance. 
Since theory provides relatively little guidance as to what this relationship should be, 
the study by Morck et al. (1988) is as much descriptive data analyses as formal 
hypothesis testing.  Given that theory also has no prediction on the relationship 
between executive stock option grants and firm performance, my study adopts the 
same approach as Morck et al. (1988) in my investigation of the relationship. 
Morck et al. (1988) perform a variety of piecewise linear regressions on a 
cross-section of firms.  They report a non-monotonic relationship between managerial 
stock ownership and firm performance.9  Their study attempts to explain this empirical 
link by using the incentive alignment argument as well as the entrenchment argument 
after findings are documented.   
As predicted by Jensen and Meckling (1976), increasing managerial stock 
ownership better aligns the interests of executives and shareholders.  This incentive 
alignment argument states that managerial stock ownership is positively related to firm 
performance.  In contrast, the entrenchment argument states that firm performance 
                                                 
9 Morck et al. (1988) define managerial stock ownership as firm ownership held by the board of 
directors. Tobin’s Q is used as a measure for firm performance. Their study finds a positive managerial 
stock ownership and Tobin’s Q relationship in the 0% to 5% managerial stock ownership range, a 
negative and less significant managerial stock ownership and Tobin’s Q relationship in the 5% to 25% 
managerial stock ownership range, and a further positive relationship beyond the 25% managerial stock 
ownership level. Similar patterns are displayed in results of Hermalin and Wisbach (1991) and 
Holderness et al. (1999). 
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suffers from lack of governance over the executives.  This is especially so if 
managerial stock ownership is large because executives with large stakes in the firm 
may be so influential within the firm that they do not have to consider other 
shareholders' interest.  They may also be so wealthy that they no longer derive utility 
from maximising profit.  Therefore, Morck et al. (1988) argue that the incentive 
alignment argument dominates the relationship between managerial stock ownership 
and firm performance for low levels of managerial stock ownership.  For higher levels 
of manageria l stock ownership, the entrenchment argument dominates the relationship.  
Similarly, McConnell and Servaes (1990) report an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between managerial stock ownership and firm performance.10   
Stulz (1988) offers an alternative theory for explaining the non-monotonic or 
inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial stock ownership and firm 
performance.  He focuses on a takeover premium argument.  He argues that as 
managerial stock ownership increases, executives favour more control and become 
more capable of opposing a takeover threat from the market.  As a result, the acquirers 
will have to pay higher takeover premia to gain control of the firm when managerial 
stock ownership is high.  The entrenchment effect becomes dominant as managerial 
stock ownership becomes too large.  This occurs when managerial stock ownership has 
reached a point where a takeover is no longer possible.  As a result, the firm value is 
low since it excludes any takeover premia. 
The literature (like McConnell and Servaes (1990)) merely attempts to provide 
theoretical explanations for the empirical link between managerial stock ownership 
                                                 
10 McConnell and Servaes (1990) examine insider ownership (a measure for managerial stock 
ownership) amongst other ownership characteristics such as blockholders and institutional investors. 
Insider shareholders refer to executives who manage the firm and have exclusive voting rights in the 
firm.  
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and firm performance after findings are documented.  However, these explanations 
pertain to the cross-sectional samples used for the empirical studies.  They do not 
relate to a firm’s process in seeking out its optimal level of managerial stock 
ownership.  Hence, the functional form does not imply that a firm can increase its 
value by simply increasing or decreasing its managerial stock ownership.  Rather, it 
suggests that firms with a specific firm performance tend to be associated with a 
certain level of managerial stock ownership.  Most importantly, the empirical findings 
do not constitute theories underpinning the relationship between managerial stock 
ownership (or executive stock option grants) and firm performance.  Furthermore, as 
can be seen in the next sub-section, the non-monotonic or the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between managerial stock ownership and firm performance may not exist 
when taking into consideration the endogeneity of the managerial stock ownership 
variable.   
 
2.2.2 Endogeneity of the Compensation Variables 
Although prior studies have documented a relationship between managerial 
stock ownership and firm performance, they treat executive compensation as an 
exogenous variable.  However, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that managerial stock 
ownership is endogenously determined by the riskiness of the firm, as measured by the 
volatility of stock price.  Their study investigates a cross-section of firms in the fiscal 
year 1980.  They conclude that the level of managerial stock ownership varies 
systematically across firms in ways consistent with value maximisation. 11  Similarly, a 
                                                                                                                                             
 
11 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that agency cost is high in riskier firms and executives in these 
firms should own more stakes in the firm in order to align incentives. However, they assume that the 
equity grants in the firm are not easily hedged and it is costlier for the risk adverse executives to hold 
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more recent study by Cho (1998) supports the endogeneity of the ownership 
structure.12 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) reinforces the argument for the endogeneity of the 
managerial stock ownership variable.  Their study extends the empirical specification 
of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) by including additional explanatory variables for 
managerial stock ownership.13  Their results suggest that managerial stock ownership 
is related to observable and unobservable firm characteristics that exist due to 
differences in the contracting environment.  Himmelberg et al. (1999) hypothesise that 
managerial stock ownership is endogenous and any cross-sectional variation in 
managerial stock ownership is a result of unobserved firm heterogeneity.  Their results 
using panel data for the sample period 1982 to 1992 support the hypothesis. 
Empirical evidence generally supports the endogeneity of managerial stock 
ownership, which is contrary to the basic assumption in earlier research that 
managerial stock ownership is exogenous.  Controlling for the endogeneity of the 
managerial stock ownership variable, Himmelberg et al. (1999) re-examine the 
relationship between managerial stock ownership and firm performance.  Regression 
equations using panel data are specified, with fixed firm effects to control for 
                                                                                                                                             
nondiversified portfolios. As a result, the relationship between managerial stock ownership and risk may 
not be a monotonic one.  
 
12 Cho (1998) estimates the relation among ownership structure, investment and firm performance using 
simultaneous regressions performed using 2-stage least squares (2SLS). His study focuses on insider 
ownership. Capital expenditure and R&D expenditure are used as measures for investment, while 
Tobin's Q is used as a measure for firm performance. Their results suggest that investment affects firm 
performance, which in turn affects ownership structure. 
 
13 To control for the degree of moral hazard in a firm, Himmelberg et al. (1999) include the following 
additional explanatory variables for managerial stock ownership: firm size, capital intensity, R&D 
intensity, advertising intensity, cash flow and investment rate. 
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unobserved firm heterogeneity.  Their results show that the relationship between 
managerial stock ownership and firm performance is insignificant. 
As an additional means of correcting for the problem of endogeneity, 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) adopt firm size and stock price volatility as instrumental 
variables.14  Again, they do not find any relationship between managerial stock 
ownership and firm performance.  They argue that the power of such tests could have 
been reduced with the use of both instrumental variables and fixed effect models.  A 
similar study by Palia (2001) arrives at the same conclusion. 15   
Zhou (2001) points out the potential problems in Himmelberg et al. (1999)’s 
methodology of using panel data with fixed firm effects when examining the 
managerial stock ownership and firm performance relationship.  He notes that 
managerial stock ownership differs substantially across firms but typically changes 
slowly from year to year within a firm. 16  Therefore, controlling for fixed firm effects 
would remove all cross-sectional variation.  Such a test would fail to capture any 
meaningful relationship between managerial stock ownership and firm performance, 
even if one existed.  Furthermore, Zhou (2001) argues that the assumption that firm 
                                                 
14 In contrast, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) use lagged explanatory variables as instruments. 
However, Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that unobserved firm characteristics change slowly over time, 
hence suggesting that lagged explanatory variables are as endogenous as the contemporaneous ones. 
 
15 Palia (2001) examines the relationship between CEO compensation and firm valuation. He 
specifically examines CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity, defined as the percentage of shares 
outstanding owned by the CEO, plus the percentage of shares outstanding in options awarded to the 
CEO times the Black-Scholes hedge ratio (sensitivity of CEO’s options to changes in firm value). The 
study tests panel data using fixed effects in the period 1981 to 1993. Regression equations are estimated 
using four instrumental variables: CEO experience, CEO quality of education, CEO age and firm 
volatility. Palia (2001) supports the argument of Himmelberg et al. (1999) as he concludes that 
compensation variables are endogenously determined by the firm’s contracting environment. 
 
16 Exception occurs when the executive turnover is high within the firm. In such firm, newly hired 
executives start with zero or negligible managerial stock ownership  but would accumulate ownership 
stakes in firm within a few years of hiring. 
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performance is dependent on year-to-year variations in managerial stock ownership 
contradicts the principal-agent model, whereby executives maximise their utility 
through efforts that can be predicted by firm characteristics.  In a dynamic 
environment, firm characteristics are expected to be fairly constant over time.  With 
the expectation of little change in executive efforts, there should be no meaningful 
association between yearly change in managerial stock ownership and firm 
performance. 
 
2.3 Relationship between Total Equity Ownership and Firm Performance 
Zhou (2001) recognises that executive stock option grants provide similar 
incentives as managerial stock ownership.  Comparing the CEO’s stock and stock 
option grants in terms of their roles in equity incentives between the periods 1993 to 
1997, he finds large differences between the two compensation components across 
CEOs.  About 30% of the CEOs had a negligible amount of stock option grants, 40% 
of the CEOs had an amount of stock option grants that is comparable to that of stock 
grants, and for the remaining CEOs, the amount of stock option grants is larger than 
stock grants.  In addition, his study notes that, compared to managerial stock 
ownership, executive stock option grants display a much larger variation over time for 
each firm but little difference in variation across firms.  Therefore, Zhou (2001) 
concludes that the role of executive stock option grants in providing the CEO with 
equity incentives is comparable, if not larger, than that of managerial stock ownership 
in a majority of firms. 
In addition, Zhou (2001) examines the correlation between managerial stock 
ownership and executive stock option grants.  Controlling for different levels of 
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managerial stock ownership, the study finds no consistent relation between the two 
compensation components.  In sum, his study shows that executive stock option grants 
are neither negligible, nor perfectly correlated to managerial stock ownership.  
Therefore, neither component forms a good proxy for total equity ownership. 
Empirical studies that adopt total equity ownership include Core and Guay 
(1999).  Their study measures CEO holding of equity incentives as the total incentives 
provided by his portfolio of stock and stock options. They reason that a more 
comprehensive measure of equity incentives is only possible with the inclusion of both 
compensation components in their research, which investigates whether a firm's grant 
of equity incentives is consistent with economic theory of optimal contracting.  Their 
empirical evidence suggests that firms set optimal equity incentive levels and grant 
equity incentives in a manner that is consistent with economic theory.  Given these 
findings, my study assumes that every firm tends to work towards an optimal level of 
executive stock option grants.   
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses 
 
This chapter presents the hypotheses of the study.  Section 3.1 develops the 
hypotheses on the determinants of executive stock option grants.  The hypothesis on 
the functional form of the relationship between executive stock option grants and firm 
performance is not presented here because, as highlighted before, agency theory has no 
prediction on the relationship.  Therefore, it is premature to suggest any such 
relationship in this chapter.  Instead, I present an informal discussion on the 
relationship in Section 3.2.   
 
3.1 Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants 
 
This section develops the hypotheses relating to the different determinants of 
executive stock option grants.  Section 3.1.1 presents the hypotheses rooted in agency 
theory, making predictions about the value enhancement benefits of executive stock 
option grants.  Next, Sections 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 present the hypotheses 
relating to the risk taking, tax savings, signalling and cash conservation for executive 
stock option grants respectively.   
 
3.1.1 Value Enhancement  
The principal-agent model predicts value enhancement for firms that adopt 
incentive alignment mechanisms such as executive stock options.  However, this does 
not mean that firms with few executive stock option grants are evidence against value 
enhancement benefits.  This is because compensation contracts are endogenously 
determined by the contracting environment (Himmelberg et al. (1999)).  For example, 
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a low level of executive stock option grants may provide optimal incentives for firms 
in an environment with less severe moral hazard.  Since the scope for managerial 
discretion differs across firms, a prediction of principal-agent theory is that firms with 
assets that are difficult to monitor will require higher levels of executive stock option 
grants.   
Following Himmelberg et al. (1999), I use size, capital intensity, market power, 
growth opportunities, R&D and advertising intensity as proxies for the scope of 
managerial discretion. 17 
Size.  Firm size may affect the firm’s optimal level of executive stock option 
grants as firms of different sizes may face different degrees of moral hazard 
(Himmelberg et al. (1999)).  For example, monitoring and agency costs are typically 
higher in larger firms, hence requiring a higher level of executive stock option grants 
for optimal performance.  On the other hand, monitoring cost may be lower in large 
firms because of economies of scale as well as monitoring by analysts.  However, 
given the recent accounting scandals in the large U.S. firms (for example, Enron and 
WorldCom), I expect that monitoring cost is higher in larger firms.  Any reduction of 
monitoring cost arising from economies of scale or the supervision of analysts would 
not easily offset the monitoring cost implied by firm size.  I therefore specify the 
following hypothesis18:  
H1a: Large firms grant more stock options to provide more value enhancement 
incentives to executives.19 
                                                 
17 Following Himmelberg et al. (1999), this study also attempts to use firm size as an instrumental 
variable. 
 
18 I prefix hypotheses relating to value enhancement benefits of stock option grants as H1; for risk taking 
as H2; for tax saving as H3; for signalling as H4 and for the cash conservation as H5.   
 
19 Ittner et al. (2003) use firm size as one of the determinants of equity grant intensity. They argue that 
the predicted relation between equity grants and firm size is unclear due to two opposing effects. One, it 
is difficult to monitor managers in large firms and two, it is more difficult for individual employees to 
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Capital Intensity.  For firms with a low level of capital intensity, or conversely, 
a high level of investment in intangible assets, a high level of executive stock option 
grants is required to align incentives (Himmelberg et al. (1999)).  This is because 
intangible assets are unobservable and difficult to monitor.  Hence, their use is subject 
to managerial discretion.  Therefore, I specify my next hypothesis as: 
H1b: Firms with lower capital intensity grant more stock options to provide 
more value enhancement incentives to executives. 
 
Market Power.  The scope for managerial discretion may vary according to the 
market power of a firm (Himmelberg et al. (1999)). If the firm's market power 
insulates managerial decision-making from the discipline of competitive product 
markets, then the optimal contract for managers will require higher levels of executive 
stock option grants.  I test the following hypothesis: 
  H1c: Firms with higher market power grant more stock options to provide 
more value enhancement incentives to executives. 
 
Growth Opportunities.  The growth opportunities in a firm affect the level of 
managerial discretion (Himmelberg et al. (1999)).  Hence, I specify the following 
hypothesis: 
H1d: Firms with higher growth opportunities grant more stock options to 
provide more value enhancement incentives to executives. 
 
 
R&D and Advertising Intensity.  The firm’s R&D and advertising investments 
are intangible assets that should affect future firm value.20  These expenditures are 
                                                                                                                                             
affect firm value in a large firm. Unlike Ittner et al. (2003) who examine a wider spectrum of employees 
in firms, I do not face the same problem as my study focuses on the top five executives in firms.  
 
20 Prior studies such as Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) use R&D and 
advertising expenses as proxies for future growth opportunities. On the other hand, Ittner et al. (2003) 
treat them as part of the firm's investment opportunity set. 
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more discretionary and less easily monitored (Himmelberg et al. (1999)).  Therefore, 
ceteris paribus, the greater the reliance on R&D and advertising spending by a firm to 
achieve competitive advantage, the higher is managerial discretion.  I therefore test the 
following hypotheses:  
H1e: Firms with higher R&D expenditure grant more stock options to provide 
value enhancement incentives to executives.  
 
H1f: Firms with higher advertising expenditure grant more stock options to 
provide value enhancement incentives to executives. 
  
3.1.2 Risk Taking  
The principal-agent model suggests that optimal contracts involve a trade-off 
between incentives for performance and managerial risk aversion (Himmelberg et al. 
(1999)).  This implies that firm risk also determines the level of executive stock option 
grants.  Due to managerial risk aversion as well as cost of diversification, I expect a 
firm with higher risk to require a lower level of executive stock option grants in an 
optimal contract.21  I therefore test the following hypothesis: 
H2: Firms with higher risk grant fewer stock options to lower managerial risk 
aversion and cost of diversification. 
 
On the other hand, the Black and Scholes’ (1973) option valuation 
methodology states that option value increases with firm risk.  As a result, executives 
with stock option grants are motivated to increase firm risk, hence executive stock 
option grants also determine firm risk.  My study addresses this simultaneous relation 
between executive stock option grants and firm risk using the 2SLS method. 
                                                                                                                                             
 
21 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) explain the relationship between executive stock option grants and firm risk 
differently. They argue that higher risk in firms indicates more scope for managerial discretion, hence 
increasing the level of executive stock option grants required for an optimal contract.  
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3.1.3 Tax Savings  
Stock options allow executives to enjoy a tax advantage, as they do not result in 
any taxable income until the year of exercise.22  On the other hand, executive stock 
options may be less attractive for firms, compared to other compensation schemes (for 
example, cash) that offer a tax shield on the firm's taxable income.23  Therefore, I 
expect firms to grant fewer executive stock options in periods when the marginal tax 
rates are high.  I test the following hypothesis: 
H3: Firms with higher marginal tax rates grant fewer stock options to enjoy tax 
advantage from other compensation schemes. 
 
3.1.4 Signalling  
The signalling model suggests that firms grant executive stock options when 
there is favourable insider information.  As suggested by Yermack (1997), executives 
who are aware of the firm's future earnings may influence their compensation 
committees to award more executive stock options.  By doing so, executives stand to 
benefit when options go in- the-money shortly after they are granted. I test the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: Firms grant more stock options when there is favourable insider 
information. 
 
3.1.5 Cash Conservation  
                                                 
22 In the U.S., executives are taxed at the capital gain rates for income derived from the stock options. 
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Stock options offer firms the opportunity to compensate executives and yet at 
the same time, conserve cash.  Since stock options provide "cashless" compensation to 
executives, I expect firms to substitute executive stock options for cash salary when 
faced with liquidity constraints.  Hence, I test the following hypothesis: 
H5: Firms with liquidity constraints grant more stock options to executives so 
as to conserve cash. 
 
3.2 Relationship Between Executive Stock Option Grants and Firm 
Performance 
 
As highlighted before, agency theory does not imply any relationship between 
executive stock option grants and firm performance in the cross-section.  This is 
because agency theory pertains to a specific firm and does not impose a relationship on 
cross-sectional data.  Therefore, it is premature to suggest any of such relationship.  
However, in interpreting the empirical results, the implicit assumption is that each firm 
is working towards an optimal level of executive stock option grants that is specific to 
its contracting environment at that point in time (Core and Guay (1999)).  Core and 
Guay (1999) find that firms grant CEO equity incentives and stock-based 
compensation in ways consistent with the economic determinants and an optimal 
contracting perspective.  They report that firms not only set an optimal level of 
incentives for CEO, but also actively manage the level of incentives by varying 
incentive grants.  These observations are consistent with executive stock option grants 
being endogenously determined by the characteristics of a firm's contracting 
environment. 
Given the foregoing assumption, I do not interpret any finding on the functional 
form of the relationship between executive stock option grants and firm performance 
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as a prescription for firms seeking its optimal level of executive stock option grants.  
Instead, the function should be viewed as a snapshot of the relationship for a cross-
section of firms in a particular year.   
Besides studying the link between executive stock option grants and firm 
performance (as measured by Tobin’s Q) for a cross-section of firms, I also make a 
casual observation as to how this link is associated with the specific firm profiles.  The 
first part of my study derives conclusion on the determinants of executive stock option 
grants.  The second part of my study finds the association between executive stock 
option grants and firm performance.  Using results of the first part, I examine the 
profile of firms that lie on different parts of the function between executive stock 
option grants and firm performance. 
 
. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Data 
 
This chapter discusses the methodology and data used in the study.  Section 4.1 
explains the methodology used.  Section 4.2 defines the variables employed while 
Section 4.3 describes the data and sample selection method.   
 
4.1. Methodology of Study 
 
4.1.1. Model Specification for Analyses Using Cross-Sectional Data 
Following the literature on managerial stock ownership, I test the various 
hypotheses on the determinants of executive stock option grants using cross-sectional 
data.  I estimate, for each year, the following OLS regression: 
iiii SavingsTaxTakingRiskIncentivesGrants __ 3210 rrrr +++=    
iii onConservatiCashSignalling urr +++ _54  (1) 
 
with Grants representing executive stock option grants; Incentives representing value 
enhancement; Risk_Taking representing risk taking;  Tax_Savings tax savings; 
Signalling representing signalling; and Cash_Conservation representing cash 
conservation. 24 
To test the cross-sectional relationship between executive stock option grants 
and firm performance, I estimate, for each year, a simple cross-sectional OLS 
regression, as follows: 
                                                 
24 I perform robustness tests that include managerial stock ownership as a control variable.  My results 
remain robust even after including managerial stock ownership as a control variable (results are 
available upon request).   
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iiiii SavingsTaxTakingRiskIncentivesGrantsePerformanc __ 43210 yyyyy ++++=
iii onConservatiCashSignalling vyy +++ _65   (2) 
 
with Performance representing the measure for firm performance. 
 
I include the determinants of executive stock option grants as control variables 
for equation (2).  This is  to deal with the possibility that a variety of factors can jointly 
affect executive stock option grants and firm performance.  For example, R&D and 
advertising intensity could affect both executive stock option grants and firm 
performance.  Hence, to avoid inducing a spurious correlation between executive stock 
option grants and firm performance, I control for additional variables in equation (2).25 
I carry out all cross-sectional regression analyses using the program EasyReg 
(Bierens, 2002). The analyses are performed using t-statistics (or p-values) based on 
the White’s (1980) standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
4.1.2. Model Specification for Analyses Using Pooled and Panel Data 
Following Himmelberg et al. (1999), I conduct my analyses using the pooled 
and panel data.  Analyses using panel data are performed with fixed firm and industry 
effects to control for endogeneity in the option grant variable.26  I adopt the fixed firm 
effects model despite Zhou (2001)’s arguments against the use of fixed firm effects.27  
The reason is that my study concentrates on executive stock option grants and Zhou 
                                                 
25 My results remain robust, even after excluding these control variables (results are available upon 
request). Hence, the control variables would not bias my test results. 
 
26 The fixed firm effect and industry effect models are not always associated with endogeneity.  These 
models are also used when regression residuals are corrected cross-sectionally or between adjacent 
periods. As part of the robustness tests, my study also uses instrumental variables to address the 
concerns on endogeneity. Analysis with instrumental variables is discussed in the next section. 
 
27 Zhou (2001) argues that fixed firm effects remove all cross-sectional variation in managerial stock 
ownership.  Therefore, the fixed firm effects should not be used on the ownership variable, especially 
when it exhibits little variation within a firm.   
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(2001) finds a significantly larger variation of executive stock option grants over time 
for each firm.  This justifies the use of the panel data with fixed effects model.  
Furthermore, as mentioned in Himmelberg et al. (1999), it is difficult to find 
appropriate instrumental variables for the ownership variable.  Hence, it is important 
for my study to use a methodology other than instrumental variables to control for the 
problem of endogeneity. 
Similar to Himmelberg et al. (1999), I adopt balanced panel data and assume 
that the unobserved firm characteristics are time- invariant.  I test the implications of 
the various hypotheses using a static balanced panel data model with fixed effects.  My 
static panel data model takes the simplified form as follows: 
itiitit eGrants +++= mcaa 10 , t = 1, ….,T,    i = 1,…,N.  (3) 
where 0a is the constant term of the equation; itc  are the p´1 vectors of the exogenous 
variables, thus representing the p observable set of firm characteristics (i.e. the p 
number of determinants of executive stock option grants); im  is a fixed effect which is 
constant over time t but varies with the cross-section i, thus representing the 
unobservable firm characteristics; and eit are error terms that are independent of the 
exogenous variables.   
 
I can also write the model in the following vector form: 
*** 10 iiii eGrants +++= mcaa , (4) 
where 
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To control for the industry and firm heterogeneity, I adopt industry effects 
(using three-digit SIC codes, i.e. SIC3) and firm fixed effects in my panel data 
analyses respectively.  The models are also applied to the analyses of the relationship 
between executive stock option grants and firm performance.   
The matrix programming software Gauss is used to perform the pooled and 
panel data analyses.  Appendix 1 shows an example of the Gauss program code for the 
pooled and panel data analyses.  Similar to the cross-sectional analyses, my t-statistics 
(or p-values) for the panel data analyses are based on the White’s (1980) standard 
errors that remain robust to heteroskedasticity.  For robustness, I also perform the 
Ljung-Box test to check if autocorrelation exist in the pooled data sets (Ljung and Box, 
1978).28    
                                                 
28 For simplicity, the Ljung-Box (LB) tests with lag one to five periods are conducted only on the pooled 
data sets. The tests would be extended on the panel data only when autocorrelation exists in the pooled 

















, where n is the sample size, 
r(k) is the autocorrelation at lag k , and m is the number of lags being tested.   
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4.1.3. Model Specification for Analyses With Instrumental Variables 
I attempt another approach to correct for the problem of endogeneity in the 
executive stock option grant variable.  I repeat my cross-sectional and panel data 
analyses of the relationship between executive stock option grants and firm 
performance with instrumental variables.  The equation is specified as follows: 
iiiii SavingsTaxTakingRiskIncentivesIVePerformanc __ 43210 qqqqq ++++=
iii eonConservatiCashSignalling +++ _65 qq  (6) 
where IVi are the instrumental variables of executive stock option grants for firm i, and 
the other independent variables exclude the variables that are already being used as the 
instrumental variables.  
 
  
4.1.4. Specification of the Executive Stock Option Grant Variable  
To determine the appropriate specification of the executive stock option grant 
variable to be used in my investigation of the relationship between executive stock 
option grants and firm performance, I perform three simple analyses common in the 
managerial stock ownership literature - linear, piecewise and curvilinear regressions.  I 
obtain the adjusted R-square value for each specification-year and compute an average 
for each of the specifications.  The specification that yields the highest average 
adjusted R-square value is used for further analysis.  The following are the 
specifications for each of the regressions: 
 
Linear Specification:   
iii eGrantsePerformanc ++= 10 ll    (7) 
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Piecewise Specification:   
iiiii overZGrantsYtoZGrantstoYGrantsePerformanc effff ++++= __0_ 3210  (8) 
with Y and Z being the lower and upper breakpoints of the value of executive stock 
option grants in the piecewise regression. 
 
Curvilinear Specification:  
iiii GrantsGrantsePerformanc xuuu +++=
2
210  (9) 
 
4.2 Definitions of Variables 
In this section, I describe the variables used to test my hypotheses.  Section 
4.2.1 describes the measures used for executive stock option grants, while Section 
4.2.2 details the measures of the determinants of executive stock option grants.  
Section 4.2.3 introduces the firm performance measure used to investigate the 
relationship between executive stock option grants and firm performance.  Finally, 
Section 4.2.4 describes the instrumental variables of executive stock option grants.  
Table 1 summarises the definitions of these variables. 
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Table 1: Definitions of Variables  
This table shows the definitions and measures of the study. Natural logarithms of the executive stock 
option grant, firm size and favourable firm news variables are computed to provide greater variation in 
the regressions. The square terms of the executive stock option grant, firm size and capital intensity 
variables are computed to allow for non-linearities. A dummy variable is included for each of the R&D 
intensity, advertising intensity, total risk and favourable firm news variables, so as the maintain sample 
size for the regressions and at the same time, reduce the risk of sample bias as missing observations of 
the variables are set to zero. The dummy variable allows the intercept term to capture the mean of the 
variable for missing value. I include in-the-money executive stock option grants that are unexercisable 
in my measure for executive stock option grant as they bring potential benefits to the executives. All 
values of executive stock option grants are derived from ExecuComp’s modified Black and Scholes 
(1973) option valuation methodology. 
Variables Measures Definitions  
1. LN(CEX) Executive stock option 
grant 
Natural logarithm of the average of executive stock 
option grants for the firm's top five executives, where 
executive stock option grants = (total executive stock 
option grants during the fiscal year) + (cumulative in-
the-money executive stock option grants that are 
exercisable) + (cumulative in-the-money executive 
stock option grants that are unexercisable) 
 
2. [LN(CEX)] 2 Square of executive stock 
option grant 
 
Square of LN(CEX) 
 
3. Tobin’s Q Firm performance  [Market value of common stock + (preferred 
dividends*10) + book value of total liabilities ] / book 






Natural logarithm of sales 
5. [LN(S)]2 
 
Square of firm size Square of LN(S) 




Square of capital intensity 
 
Square of K/S 
8. EBIT/S Market power 
 
Earnings before interest and tax / sales 
9. I/K Growth opportunities Capital expenditure / Property, plant, and equipment 
 
10. RD/K Research & development 
(R&D) intensity 
 
R&D expenditures / Property, plant, and equipment 
 
11. RDUM Dummy variable for R&D 
intensity 
 
Dummy variable, where 1 = if RD/K data is available, 
and 0 = if otherwise 
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Table 1: Definitions of Variables– Continued 
 
This table shows the definitions and measures of the study. Natural logarithms of the executive stock 
option grant, firm size and favourable firm news variables are computed to provide greater variation in 
the regressions. The square terms of the executive stock option grant, firm size and capital intensity 
variables are computed to allow for non-linearities. A dummy variable is included for each of the R&D 
intensity, advertising intensity, total risk and favourable firm news variables, so as the maintain sample 
size for the regressions and at the same time, reduce the risk of sample bias as missing observations of 
the variables are set to zero. The dummy variable allows the intercept term to capture the mean of the 
variable for missing value. I include in-the-money executive stock option grants that are unexercisable 
in my measure for executive stock option grant as they bring potential benefits to the executives. All 
values of executive stock option grants are derived from ExecuComp’s modified Black and Scholes 
(1973) option valuation methodology. 
Variables Measures Definition 
12. A/K Advertising intensity 
 
Advertising expenditures / Property, plant, and 
equipment 
 
13. ADUM Dummy variable for 
advertising intensity 
Dummy variable, where 1 = if A/K data is available, 




Total risk  
 
 
The variance of daily stock returns for each fiscal year 
 
15. SDUM Dummy variable for total 
risk 
Dummy variable, where 1 = if SIG data is available, 
and 0 = if otherwise  
  
16. LTDUM Low marginal tax rate Dummy variable, where 1 = if a firm has negative 
pretax book income and net operating loss carry-
forward, and 0 = if otherwise. 
 
17. HTDUM High marginal tax rate Dummy variable, where 1 = if a firm has positive 
pretax book income and no net operating loss carry-




Favourable firm news 
 
Natural logarithm of insiders’ purchases of firm 
stock. 
 
19. INSDUM Dummy variable for 
favorable firm news 
Dummy variable, where 1 = if LN(INS) data is 
available, and 0 = if otherwise  
 
20. CASHSF Cash shortfall [(3-year average of common and preferred dividends) 
+ cash flow used in investing activities – cash flow 
from operations] / total assets  
 
21. INTBD Interest burden 3-year average of interest expense / operating income 
before depreciation 
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4.2.1 Executive Stock Option Grants 
The literature provides several measures for equity ownership.  One common 
measure is the total number of stock or stock options as a fraction of total shares 
outstanding (Himmelberg et. al. (1999) and Zhou (2001)).  However, given the large 
difference between the total number of shares owned by executives and the total 
number of shares in a firm, the measure hardly varies over time for a given firm.  
Furthermore, this measure is not adequate in the context of executive stock option 
grants for the following two reasons.  First, it is inappropriate to compare the number 
of options that are not in-the-money with the total outstanding shares of the firms 
because the former are less likely to translate into shares upon exercise.  Second, the 
measure does not account for the dilution problem of new shares.  This is because the 
existing share price of the firm drops when stock options are exercised.  This occurs 
when the firm holds no treasury stock.   
 Palia (2001) adopts another kind of measure.  He specifically examines the 
CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity, defined as the percentage of shares outstanding 
owned by the CEO plus the percentage of shares outstanding in options awarded to the 
CEO, times the Black-Scholes hedge ratio.29   Although this measure is valid for the 
evaluation of CEO compensation, its focus on only one executive is too narrow for my 
purpose.  Besides, it is subject to the unrealistic assumptions used in the Black-
Scholes' (1973) valuation model.30 
                                                 
29 The Black-Scholes hedge ratio refers to the sensitivity of the CEO’s options to changes in firm value. 
This ratio is also used in Yermack (1995). It is based on the Black and Scholes’ (1973) option valuation 
model but it allows for dividends. 
 
30 The valuation is based on the actual term of the executive stock option grants, which is unrealistic as 
executives rarely wait until the expiration date to exercise their options.  
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In contrast to previous studies, my study includes the top five highest paid 
executives in a firm in measuring executive stock option grants.  I measure cumulative 
option grants, hence the notation of CEX for executive stock option grants.  I use the 
natural logarithm of the average of (i) the total executive stock option values granted in 
a single year, (ii) the cumulative in-the-money executive stock option values that are 
exercisable, and (iii) the cumulative in-the-money executive stock option values that 
are unexercisable, for the firm's top five executives.  I include stock options that are 
unexercisable as they bring potential benefits to the executives.  My measure for 
executive stock option grants provides greater variation in my regression analyses.  
However, the interpretation of my regression results must take into consideration the 
natural logarithm transformation of the executive stock option grants. 
To address problems related to the Black and Scholes’ (1973) option valuation 
methodology, I adopt values of executive stock options as computed by the 
ExecuComp’s modified Black and Scholes’ (1973) option valuation methodology.  
The modification is made by computing option value based on the assumption that the 
term of the option is 70% of its actual term.  This is because executives rarely wait 
until expiration to exercise their stock options. 
 
4.2.2 Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants 
This sub-section details the measures for the determinants of executive stock 
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a) Measures for Value Enhancement  
Size.  Following Himmelberg (1999), I measure firm size using the natural 
logarithm of firm sales, LN(S), and its square, [LN(S)]2.   
Capital Intensity.  The capital-to-sales ratio, K/S, is used to measure the relative 
importance of capital in a firm.  Capital is defined as the tangible, long-term assets 
(stock, property, plant and equipment).  I also include the square of the variable, 
(K/S)2, to allow for nonlinearities. 
Market Power.  Himmelberg et al. (1999) use free cash flow as a measure for 
market power.31  Citing Jensen (1986), they argue that a firm’s free cash flow is related 
to its executive ownership.  This means that ceteris paribus, the higher is a firm’s free 
cash flow, the higher is the desired level of executive ownership.  However, 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) note that free cash flow is not empirically observable.  They 
adopt the ratio of operating income to total assets as an empirical proxy for free cash 
flow.  In this study, I adopt a more direct proxy for market power.  I use the ratio of the 
firm’s earnings before interest and tax to total sales, EBIT/S, as the variable since it 
measures the basic earning power in a firm regardless of the firm’s capital structure.   
Growth Opportunities.  Following Himmelberg et al. (1999), I use a firm’s 
investment rate, measured by the ratio of capital expenditures to capital, I/K, to proxy 
for the link between high growth and opportunities for discretionary projects.   
R&D and Advertising Intensity.  I measure the R&D intensity by the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to capital, RD/K, and advertising intensity by the ratio of 
advertising expenditures to capital, A/K.  Following Himmelberg et al. (1999), I create 
two dummy variables, RDUM and ADUM to maintain sample size and reduce the risk 
                                                 
31 Free cash flow is the difference between the cash flow and the expenditure on value-added investment 
projects. In other words, it is the gross cash flow available from operations.  
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of sample selection bias.  These dummy variables equal one if the data required for 
RD/K and A/K is available, and zero if the data is missing. 32 
 
b) Measures for Risk Taking Motivation  
Following Palia (2001), study hypothesises total risk of a firm as a determinant 
of executive stock option grants.  I use volatility, SIG, defined as the variance of the 
firm’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year, as a proxy of the firm's total risk.  
Following Himmelberg et al. (1999), a dummy variable, SDUM, is created to maintain 
sample size and reduce sample selection bias.  SDUM equals one if the data required 
for SIG is available, and zero if the data is missing. 
As discussed before, this study addresses the interaction between executive 
stock option grants and firm risk.  Studies such as Mandelker and Rhee (1984) argue 
that operating and financial leverage increase firm risk.  I specify firm risk to be a 
function of executive stock option grant, firm size, operating leverage and financial 
leverage.33  I use K/S as a measure for operating leverage and total debt-to-sales ratio, 
D/S, as a measure for financial leverage.  To capture the inter-relation between 
executive stock option grants and firm risk, I perform simultaneous regressions using 
2SLS on the following two equations: 
                                                                                                                                             
 
32 For robustness, I repeat the cross-sectional regressions after removing the firms with missing data (i.e. 
re-running the cross-sectional regressions in the absence of the dummy variables that are used to control 
for missing data). However, this method significantly reduces my sample size. As a result, I could only 
perform meaningful regressions for the last four years of my sample period. The results remain robust 
when these dummy variables that control for the missing data are omitted (results are available upon 
request). 
 
33 Saunders et al. (1990) examine the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk taking.  
Their study specifies risk to be a function of ownership structure, financial leverage, operating leverage 
and firm size.  Similarly, in an investigation of the relation between insider ownership and risk taking in 
the insurance industry, Downs and Sommer (1999) estimate risk using insider share ownership, firm size 
and capital. 
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c) Measures for Tax Savings  
Following Core and Guay (2001) and Ittner et al. (2003), I make the following 
two assumptions about the firm’s marginal tax rate.  First, firms with low marginal tax 
rate have negative pretax book income and net operating loss that is carried forward 
from the previous financial year.  Second, firms with high marginal tax rate have 
positive pretax book income and no net operating loss that is carried forward from the 
previous financial year.  From these assumptions, I derive two dummy variables to 
proxy for the firm’s marginal tax rate, LTDUM and HTDUM.  LTDUM, a measure for 
high marginal tax rate, equals one if a firm satisfies the first assumption, and zero if 
otherwise.  Similarly, HTDUM, a measure for low marginal tax rate, equals one if a 
firm satisfies the second assumption, and zero if otherwise.34 
 
d) Measures for Signalling  
This study uses the natural logarithm of the total value of insider purchase of a 
firm’s stock in a fiscal year, LN(INS), to proxy for any favourable insider information 
                                                                                                                                             
 
34 To proxy for a firm’s marginal tax rate, Yermack (1995) uses a simple dummy variable that equals 
one if a firm has zero tax carry -forward, and zero if otherwise. 
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in a firm.  A dummy variable, INSDUM, is used.  INSDUM equals one if the data 
required for LN(INS) is available, and zero if the data is missing. 
 
e) Measures for Cash Conservation  
I follow Core and Guay (1999, 2001) in using cash flow shortfall, CASHSF, 
and interest burden, INTBD, to proxy for liquidity constraints in a firm.  I define 
CASHSF as the ratio of the three-year average of common and preferred dividends plus 
cash flow used in the investing activities less cash flow from operations, to the total 
assets of the firm.  INTBD is defined as the three-year average of interest expense 
scaled by operating income before depreciation. 
To identify firms facing liquidity constraints, Yermack (1995) uses a dummy 
variable, which equals one if a firm pays zero dividend to common shareholders, and 
zero if otherwise.  He argues that firms paying zero dividend should include a greater 
portion of stock options in their CEO’s compensation since these firms are likely to 
face liquidity constraints.  However, I do not adopt this approach since executives may 
be motivated to reduce dividend payments in order to increase the value of stock 
options (Yermack (1995)).  
 
4.2.3 Firm Performance 
Firm performance is measured using Tobin’s Q as it standardises firm value, 
enabling comparisons across firms with different characteristics.  Following 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), I define Q as the ratio of firm value to the replacement 
value of assets.  Firm value is measured using the market value of common equity plus 
the estimated market value of preferred stock (estimated as ten times the preferred 
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dividend) plus the book value of total liabilities.  Replacement value of assets is 
measured using the book value of total assets.35 
 
4.2.4. Instrumental Variables 
Adapting the methodology of Himmelberg et al. (1999), I use two instrumental 
variables for executive stock option grants: firm size and firm volatility.  It could be 
argued that firm size and volatility correlate with Q, with high values of Q reflecting 
high growth opportunities in a firm, and such a firm tend to be smaller and have more 
volatile stock prices.  However, as mentioned by Himmelberg et al. (1999), studies of 
fixed investments suggest that the deviations of Q from its equilibrium value are 
explained by the costs of adjusting capital stock, which are proportional to investment 
rate.  Hence, growth opportunities can be adequately controlled for by including 
investment rate, advertising and R&D intensity in my regression of Q on executive 
stock option grants.  This argument supports excluding firm size and firm volatility as 
independent variables and adopting them as instrumental variables. 
 
4.3. Data and Sample Selection 
I obtain executive compensation data from the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
ExecuComp database, financial data from the S&P’s Compustat database, stock data 
                                                 
35 Other definitions of Q are also used in the literature. For example, Morck et al. (1988) defines Q as 
the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement costs of its physical assets, where the numerator 
is the sum of the actual market value of common stock and the estimated market values of preferred 
stock and debt, and the denominator is  the replacement cost of firm’s plant and inventories. On the other 
hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) define Q as the ratio of the sum of firm’s market value of equity, 
book value of long-term debt, book value of short-term debt, preferred stock at liquidating value, book 
value of convertible debt and convertible preferred stock, to the book value of total assets. 
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from the CRSP database and insider trade data from the Shareworld database.36  Based 
on the available data from ExecuComp, my study covers the period from the year 1992 
to 2001.  To be included in my sample, a firm must have no missing data for the key 
variables Q, LN(CEX), LN(S), K/S and EBIT/S, I/K, CASHSF and INTBD.  I further 
winsorise my data by excluding 5% of the firms with variables that are outliers on 
either side. This sampling procedure yields a total of 10,121 observations for the 10-
year sample period.   
For robustness, my study repeats the tests on two sets of balanced panel data.  
The first set is selected from the full 10-year sample period, from the year 1992 to 
2001.  It comprises 83 firms and yields a total of 830 observations.  The second set of 
panel data is selected from half of the sample period, from the year 1997 to 2001. 
Although the time series is shorter, the total observations exceed that of the first panel 
set because there are more firms existing in the later years of the sample period.  It 
comprises 409 firms and yields a total of 2,045 observations.37 Among the various 
sample periods, this sample period yields the highest number of observations.  Table 2 
summarises the resulting sample size of my study after applying each sampling 
criterion. 
 
                                                 
36 All financial databases are provided by the Financial Database, The NUS Business School.  
 
37 A given firm can exist in both panels. This is because the first panel is a subset of the second panel. 
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Table 2: Sampling Criteria and Resulting Sample Size  
This table shows the various sampling criteria used in the study and the resulting sample size after 
applying each of the sampling criteria. For example, in the entire 10-year period, the original data has a 
total of 12,742 observations. This is being reduced to 10,755 observations after I eliminate firms with 
missing data on Q, LN(CEX) , LN(S) , K/S and EBIT/S, I/K, CASHSF and INTBD. It is further reduced to 
10,121 observations after winsorisation and this set of data forms the sample size for my cross-sectional 
analyses. For the balanced panel data for the period 1992 to 2001 and the period 1997 to 2001, there are 
a total of 830 and 2,045 observations respectively. The period 1992 to 2001 has fewer observations 
because there are more firms with missing data in the earlier years. 










Balanced panel  
for the period 
1992 to 2001 
Balanced panel  
for the period 
1997 to 2001 
      
1992 659 547 505 83 - 
1993 945 802 753 83 - 
1994 1049 903 852 83 - 
1995 1147 987 925 83 - 
1996 1365 1170 1131 83 - 
1997 1478 1258 1187 83 409 
1998 1606 1343 1257 83 409 
1999 1620 1365 1282 83 409 
2000 1550 1304 1220 83 409 
2001 1323 1076 1009 83 409 
Entire 
period 12742 10755 10121 830 2045 
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Chapter 5: Analyses and Findings  
This chapter presents the analyses and findings of my study.  Section 5.1 
discusses how the specification of the executive stock option grant variable used for 
this study is derived, while Section 5.2 presents the summary statistics and correlation 
coefficient matrix of the data.  Section 5.3 and 5.4 present the empirical evidence on 
the determinants of executive stock option grants and on the relationship between 
executive stock option grants and firm performance respectively.  Section 5.5 presents 
the robustness tests.  
 
5.1 Specification of the Executive Stock Option Grant Variable 
I perform regressions on equations (7), (8) and (9) to determine the most 
appropriate specification of the executive stock option grant variable.  For the 
piecewise regression, I vary the values of the lower and upper breakpoints between 12 
and 16 (i.e. executive stock option grants with value of US$0.16 million and US$8.89 
million respectively).  Table 3 shows the matrix that specifies the combina tions of the 
lower and upper breakpoints.  The table yields a total of ten regressions for each year.  
The equation with breakpoints that yield the highest average adjusted R-square value 
will be used to represent the piecewise regression.   
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Table 3: Combinations of Lower and Upper Breakpoints for Piecewise Regression 
This table shows the combinations of the lower and upper breakpoints used for my piecewise 
regressions. The breakpoint lies between the value 12 and 16 of LN(CEX) , where LN(CEX) is a measure 
for executive stock option grants.  
Lower breakpoint : 
Value of LN(CEX) 
Upper breakpoint :  
Value of LN(CEX) 
12 13 14 15 16 
13 - 14 15 16 
14 - - 15 16 
15 - - - 16 
 
The adjusted R-square values for the cross-sectional linear, piecewise and 
curvilinear regressions are recorded for each of the years from 1992 to 2001.  The 10-
year average of the adjusted R-square value for each of these specifications is 
computed (results are available upon request).  My results show that the curvilinear 
regressions yie ld the highest average adjusted R-square value of 0.1294.  The 
piecewise regressions with lower and upper breakpoints of 13 and 16 respectively 
yield an average adjusted R-square value of 0.1292.   On the other hand, the linear 
regressions yield a relatively lower average adjusted R-square value of 0.1137.  Using 
specifications of the highest adjusted R-square value, my study adopts the curvilinear 
specification of the executive stock option grant variable for further analyses, denoted 
with variables LN(CEX) and [LN(CEX)]2. 
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
Table 4 summarises the descriptive statistics of the key variables used for my 
cross-sectional analyses for the period 1992 to 2001.  The mean of LN(CEX) generally 
increases over the period, with LN(CEX) increasing from a mean of 13.6 in 1992 to a 
mean of 14.9 in 2001.38  This is consistent with the findings of Zhou (2001) that stock 
option grants vary over time.  The table also shows that the mean of LTDUM is 
consistently much lower than that of HTDUM.  This suggests that a majority of the 
firms in my cross-sectional data have high marginal tax rates. 39,40   Likewise, the mean 
of LN(INS) is observed to be relatively low during the early years (in particular from 
1992 to 1995), due mainly to a small number of observations.41  
From Table 4, I also observe that the mean of CASHSF is negative across all 
years.  This indicates that the typical firm in my sample has cash flow from operations 
that exceeds the sum of cash flow used in dividends and investing activities.  It implies 
that the cash flow constraint tends not to be binding for my sample firms and suggests 
that the cash conservation determinants is not likely to be observed in my sample 
firms. 
                                                 
38 In other words, for the year 1992 and 2001, executives in our sample firms hold an average of 
US$0.8m and US$3.0m in stock options respectively. 
 
39 A closer examination of the LTDUM  variable confirms my observation that most of the firms in my 
cross-sectional data set have high marginal tax rates, as very few firms have a value of one for LTDUM . 
The number of firms that have a value of one for LTDUM range from 18 in 1992 to 68 in 2001.  
 
40 LTDUM  and HTDUM  capture only firms with obvious high and low marginal tax rates respectively.  
They do not capture the following two types of firms: (i) firms with negative pretax book income but no 
net operating loss that is carried forward from previous financial year and (ii) firms with positive pretax 
book income but net operating loss that is carried forward from previous financial year.  An examination 
of my data shows that about 30% of the firms in my database are not captured in either LTDUM or 
HTDUM , as these firms do not have distinctive high or low marginal tax rates. 
 
41 In 1992, I have only five observations for LN(INS) as compared to 962 observations in 2001. Hence, 
the related findings for the earlier years are not indicative of my results. 
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Table 5 summarises the descriptive statistics for the key variables of my panel 
data.  Panel A describes summary statistics for my panel data of 83 firms for the period 
1992 to 2001.  Similar to the statistics for the cross-sectional data in Table 4, the mean 
of LN(CEX) generally increases over time.  The mean of LTDUM remains zero for the 
sample firms in the year 1993, as there is no firm with a low marginal tax rate for that 
particular year. A majority of the sample firms have high marginal tax rates.  Similar 
characteristics are observed in Panel B of Table 5, which shows the summary statistics 
for my panel data of 409 firms for the period 1997 to 2001.   
Table 6 shows the correlation coefficient matrix for the cross-sectional sample 
of 505 firms in the year 1992.  As shown in the table, the independent variables are 
generally not correlated with one another.  In order not to overwhelm the reader with 
all ten correlation coefficient matrices, I have reported only one such matrix.  The 
other correlation coefficient matrices are available upon request. 
 
5.3 Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants  
In this section, I focus on the determinants of executive stock option grants.  To 
assess the empirical validity of the various predictions specified in Chapter 3, analyses 
are first carried out on my cross-sectional models, followed by my panel models.  
Results are presented in Section 5.3.1 (for cross-sectional models) and Section 5.3.2 
(for pooled and panel models).  I report the estimated coefficients and their White’s 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  In addition, the robustness tests 
on the pooled data sets using the Ljung-Box test show no evidence of serial correlation. 
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5.3.1 Cross-Sectional Analyses 
Table 7 reports the estimates of the determinants of executive stock option 
grants for the period 1992 to 2001 using cross-sectional analyses. The table shows that 
for seven of the ten regressions, the coefficient for LN(S) is significantly negative at 
the 10% level, while the coefficient for [LN(S)]2 is significantly positive at the  10% 
level.  This observation supports an U-shaped function for the relationship between 
executive stock option grants and firm size.   
Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find firm size to be 
negatively related to managerial stock ownership.  However, these empirical findings 
are specific to their sample firms, year and data.  They should not be used to conclude 
that a larger firm should provide a lower managerial stock ownership to executives.   
Given my assumption that each firm tends to work towards an optimal level of 
executive stock option, the U-shaped functional form suggests that both small and 
large firms tend to be associated with high levels of executive stock option grants in 
the cross-section.  However, a closer examination of my sample firms shows that a 
majority of the firms lie on the upward slope of the U-shaped curve.  This observation 
suggests that large firms tend to have high agency costs, and granting a high level of 
executive stock option grants may be optimal to dispense the high monitoring cost.  
Therefore, I conclude that my results support Hypothesis 1a. 
Results for capital intensity provide moderate support for Hypothesis 1b that 
firms with lower capital intensity grant more stock options to executives.  Five of the 
ten coefficients for K/S are significantly negative at the 5% level.  On the other hand, 
the coefficients for (K/S)2 are insignificant, thus ruling out non- linearities for capital 
intensity. 
The Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants and the Link Between Executive Stock Option 
Grants and Firm Performance. 
Chapter 5: Analyses and Findings 
 
 52 
The Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants and the Link Between Executive Stock Option 
Grants and Firm Performance. 
Chapter 5: Analyses and Findings 
 
 53 
The cross-sectional results for market power are statistically weak, with the 
coefficient for EBIT/S significant at the 10% level for only two regressions.  Therefore, 
the results do not support Hypothesis 1c that firms with higher market power grant 
more stock options to executives.   
Coefficients for investment rate, I/K, and R&D expenditure, RD/K, are both 
significantly positive at the 5% level.  The results provide strong support for 
Hypotheses 1d and 1e.  In contrast, for almost all the cross-sectional regressions, the 
results for advertising expenditure do not support Hypothesis 1f that firms with higher 
advertising expenditure grant more stock options to executives.  Only three of the 
coefficients for A/K are significant at the 10% level, all of which do not have the 
predicted signs. 
After taking into consideration the simultaneous relation between executive 
stock option grants and firm risk, my results show that the coefficient for SIG is 
significantly positive for four of the ten regressions at the 5% level.  These findings do 
not support Hypothesis 2 that firms with high risk grant fewer executive stock options 
to lower managerial risk aversion and cost of diversification.  One plausible reason for 
the observed positive association between executive stock option grants and firm risk 
is that executives in risky firms have incentives to lobby for more executive stock 
option grants.  This is because the executives could subsequently increase the value of 
their options by increasing firm risk.   
The results for my 2SLS regressions of the simultaneous relationship between 
executive stock option grants and firm risk show that when firm risk is regressed on 
executive stock option grants, seven of the ten coefficients for LN(CEX) are 
significantly positive (results are available upon request).  This observation supports 
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the argument that executives with executive stock option grants are motivated to 
increase firm risk. 
Alternatively, it can also be argued that firm risk offers scope for managerial 
discretion and high-risk firms require high level of equity ownership in an optimal 
contract (Demsetz and Lehn (1985)).  This argument explains my results that firm risk 
is positively related to executive stock option grants. 
Results for the tax saving determinants of executive stock option grants are 
inconsistent.  None of the coefficients for low marginal tax rates, LTDUM, is 
significant at the 10% level.  I believe this is because few firms in my sample have low 
marginal tax rates.  On the other hand, only two of the coefficients for high marginal 
tax rates, HTDUM, are significant at the 5% level.  Hence, these results provide weak 
support for Hypothesis 3 that firms with high marginal tax rates grant fewer executive 
stock options.  
My results for the signalling determinants strongly support Hypothesis 4 that 
firms grant more executive stock options when there is favourable insider information.  
Seven of the coefficients for LN(INS) are significant at the 5% level. 42   
Finally, the results for the cash conservation determinants do not support 
Hypothesis 5 that firms with liquidity constraints grant more executive stock options in 
lieu of cash.  As discussed earlier, cash flow constraints are not binding in my data as 
the sample firms have more than enough cash.  Therefore, the insignificance of the 
coefficients for cash conservation determinants is expected in my sample.   
                                                 
42 As discussed earlier, the LN(INS) variable suffers from having few observations during the years 1992 
to 1995, with fewer than half of the sample firms having a value for LN(INS). This may be a reason for 
the lack of significance in the results during the early years of the period.  
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To summarise, most of the coefficients for the incentives variables, LN(S), K/S, 
I/K and RD/K are significant and have the predicted sign for my cross-sectional 
analyses.  In other words, Hypothesis 1a, 1d and 1e are supported.  My results also 
show that the signalling determinants of executive stock option grants strongly support 
Hypothesis 4.  However, the risk taking and tax saving determinants of executive stock 
option grants are inconsistent.43 
 
5.3.2 Pooled and Panel Data Analyses 
Table 8 presents the estimates of the determinants of executive stock option 
grants for pooled and two sets of balanced panel data – (i) a sample of 83 firms for the 
period 1992 to 2001, and (ii) a sample of 409 firms for the period 1997 to 2001.  The 
first column reports findings for my pooled data for all firm-years.    The second and 
third column report findings for panel data using fixed firm and industry effects to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm and industry level respectively.44   
Results for the pooled data are similar to that for the cross-sectional data, 
except for the HTDUM and INTBD variables.  The pooled data do not support the tax 
saving hypothesis with the coefficients for HTDUM insignificant for both periods.  In 
addition, unlike the cross-sectional results, the coefficients for INTBD are insignificant. 
                                                 
43 I separate my data into high technology and  non-technology firms and repeat the cross-sectional tests 
on these two sets of firms. Appendix 2 defines the high technology industry used for this study. 
Appendix 3 and 4 present the results of the test for high technology and non-technology firms 
respectively. Similar to the earlier findings, my results show that Hypotheses 1d, 1e and 4 (on growth 
opportunities, R&D intensity and signalling respectively) are supported by firms in both the high 
technology and non-technology firms. However, Hypothesis 1a (on firm size) is no longer significant for 
firms in the high technology industry. This shows that size is not a determining factor for high 
technology firms that grant executive stock options. One explanation is that technology firms generally 
grant more executive stock options regardless of firm size. A robustness test using dummy variables for 
high technology and non-technology firms finds that high technology firms consistently grant more 
executive stock options compared to non-technolgoy firms (the results are available upon request). 
 
44 For the period 1992 to 2001 and 1997 to 2001, I have a total of 58 and 144 SIC3 industry constants 
respectively. 
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Generally, the results for the cross-sectional analyses are similar to that of the 
analyses using panel data with fixed firm effects.  However, unlike the cross-sectional 
analyses, results for the analyses using panel data with fixed firm effects show that the 
coefficient for LN(S) is significantly positive at the 5% level for the period 1997 to 
2001.  In addition, the coefficients for A/K for my analyses using panel data with fixed 
firm effects provide strong support for Hypothesis 1f.   
For the analyses using panel data with industry effects, the results are generally 
insignificant, except for the coefficients for A/K, LN(INS) and CASHSF for the period 
1992 to 2001 and the coefficients for SIG, LN(INS) and CASHSF for the period 1997 
to 2001.  One plausible explanation for the A/K coefficient being significant after 
controlling for the industry effects, is that only a few industries invest significantly in 
advertising.  In addition, the coefficients for SIG are significant at the 5% level for all 
the specification models for the period 1997 to 2001.  This suggests that for most 
sample firms in that period, executive stock option grants are explained significantly 
by firm volatility.  Interestingly, it is during this period when the Internet boom first 
started and many young and volatile start-up companies began to grant executive stock 
options.   
To summarise, my results suggest that firm-specific rather than industry-
specific endogeneity help to explain the use of executive stock option grants.  The 
panel data models result in much higher adjusted R-square values than those with the 
cross-sectional models.45  Therefore, I find strong support that executive stock option 
grants are endogenously determined by the firm’s contracting environment. 
                                                 
45 The panel data specification models yield adjusted R-square values of between 0.74 and 0.81, while 
the cross-sectional specification models yield adjusted R-square values of between 0.15 and 0.47.  In 
particular, the adjusted R-square values for the fixed firm effects models are consistently higher than 
those with fixed industry effects. 
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5.4 Relationship Between Executive Stock Option Grants and Firm 
Performance 
 
Having established the validity of the value enhancement and signalling 
determinants of executive stock option grants, I conclude that executive stock option 
grants are endogenously determined by the firm’s contracting environment.  Next, I 
investigate how executive stock option grants are related to firm performance after 
controlling for the endogeneity of the executive stock option grant variable.  My 
results are organised as follows.  Section 5.4.1 presents the analyses using cross-
sectional data, where I control for the firm characteristics as discussed earlier.  Section 
5.4.2 presents the analyses us ing pooled and panel data where I control for 
unobservable firm characteristics using fixed effects.  The analyses using instrumental 
variables are presented in Section 5.4.3.  Finally, Section 5.4.4 presents the findings on 
how the determinants of executive stock option grants are associated with the link 
between executive stock option grants and firm performance. 
 
5.4.1 Cross-Sectional Analyses 
Table 9 presents the empirical results for the cross-sectional analyses of the 
relationship between executive stock option grants and firm performance for the period 
1992 to 2001.  The adjusted R-square values are higher than those for analyses with 
only the executive stock option grant variable as explanatory variable (results are 
available upon request).  This suggests that the regression models with control 
variables offer a better fit.46 
                                                                                                                                             
 
46 I also believe that the control variables do not bias my test results as my results are robust even when 
firm performance is regressed on only the executive stock option grant variable (the results are available 
upon request). 
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In six of the ten regressions, I find a significant curvilinear relationship 
between executive stock option grants and firm performance, where the coefficient for 
LN(CEX) is significantly negative at the 5% level, and the coefficient for [LN(CEX)] 2 
is significantly positive at the 5% level.  These results imply an U-shaped functional 
form of the relationship between executive stock option grants and firm performance.  
Given my assumption that a firm tends to work towards an optimal level of executive 
stock option, the U-shaped function suggests that firms granting either few or many 
executive stock options in their optimal contract are associated with high Tobin’s Q 
value.   
The U-shaped function differs from the inverted U-shaped function found in 
the literature on managerial stock ownership.  However, this is not surprising given the 
difference in nature of stock and stock options.  Besides, my study examines a 
different set of sample firms as well as time period compared to prior studies.  In the 
next two sections, I examine if the results for the relationship between executive stock 
option grants and firm performance differ after controlling the problem of endogeneity 
in the executive stock option grant variable. 
 
5.4.2 Pooled and Panel Data Analyses 
Table 10 presents the results for the analyses of the relationship between 
executive stock option grants and firm performance using the pooled and panel data.  I 
report results for (i) pooled data, (ii) panel data with firm effects and (iii) panel data 
with industry effects.  The adjusted R-square values for the analyses using the panel 
data are consistently higher than those using pooled data and cross-sectional data (see 
Table 9).  
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Results for the pooled and panel data show that the coefficient for LN(CEX) is 
consistently negative and significant at the 5% level, while the coefficient for 
[LN(CEX)]2 is consistently positive and significant at the 5% level.  The results are 
consistent with the findings for the cross-sectional data.  In addition, the adjusted R-
square values are highest for the analyses using panel data with fixed firm effects.  The 
adjusted R-square values are recorded at 0.75 and 0.80 for the period 1992 to 2001 and 
1997 to 2001 respectively. 
To summarise, I find a consistent and significant U-shaped relationship 
between executive stock option grants and firm performance for analyses using the 
pooled and panel data.  My results suggest that this relationship is not spurious because 
it persists even after I correct for the problem of endogeneity.  In the next section, I 
follow Himmelberg et al. (1999) by taking a step further in using instrumental 
variables to control for the problem of endogeneity in executive stock option grants.  
 
5.4.3 Analyses with Instrumental Variables  
Table 11 reports the results for the analyses of the relationship between 
executive stock option grants and firm performance using the instrumental variables of 
firm size and firm volatility.  Panel A shows results for the cross-sectional data for the 
period 1992 to 2001.  With the inclusion of the instrumental variables, the U-shaped 
relationship between executive stock option grants and firm performance becomes less 
significant, with only three regressions supporting the U-shaped relationship at the 5% 
level.   I further examine how this relationship differs as I employ panel data analyses 
in the presence of instrumental variables. 
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Panel B shows the regressions using pooled and panel data, with results for (i) 
pooled data, (ii) panel data using firm effects and (iii) panel data using industry effects 
reported.  Similar to the results for the cross-sectional data in Panel A, there is no 
significant relationship between executive stock option grants and firm performance 
for analyses using pooled and panel data with instrumental variables.  As shown in 
Panel B, the coefficient for the estimated LN(CEX) variable becomes insignificant after 
including the instrumental variables, with the exception of that for the analyses of 
industry effects for the period 1997 to 2001. 
The foregoing results show that when instrumental variables are adopted, the 
relationship between executive stock option grants and firm performance becomes less 
significant.  One possible explanation, based on Himmelberg et al. (1999), is that the 
combined effect of using the instrumental variables and controlling for fixed effects 
reduces the precision of estimates until the tests have little power.  
In summary, my results show that, even after controlling for firm’s unobserved 
heterogeneity, an U-shaped function of the relationship between executive stock option 
grants and firm performance is observed.  This suggests that firms with either very low 
or very high levels of executive stock option grants are associated with high Tobin’s Q.   
This study draws its data from the ten-year period that covers the bullish 
market phases of the late 1990s.  On a closer examination of my cross-sectional 
results, I find that the U-shaped relationship between executive stock option grants and 
firm performance is significant mainly in the later few years of the sample period from 
the year 1998 to 2001 (see Table 9).  Furthermore, I find that majority of the firms lie 
on the upward slope of the U-shaped function, which suggests that the sample firms 
providing more executive stock option grants are generally the high performers. These 
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findings yield inferences that are consistent with the bubble that developed in the 
telecom-media-technology sectors in the late 1990s.  Appendix 5 provides a simple 
"snapshot" analysis of the profile of the firms that lie on the U-shaped function. 
 
 
5.5 Robustness Tests 
 
This section presents the robustness tests.  Section 5.5.1 presents the robustness 
test using single year stock option grants while Section 5.5.2 presents the robustness 
test using total equity grants. 
 
5.5.1 Tests on Single Year Executive Stock Option Grants 
For robustness, I adopt single year executive stock option grants (denoted as 
EX) as another measure of executive stock option grants.  EX is defined as the average 
value of the single year stock option grants to the firm's top five executives.  Similar to 
the cumulative value of executive stock option grants (denoted as CEX), I use its 
natural logarithm, LN(EX).  Appendices 6 to 10 present these results.   
Appendices 6 and 7 show the analyses of the determinants of single year 
executive stock option grants using the cross-sectional and panel data respectively.  
The adjusted R-square values for tests using single year executive stock option grants 
are typically lower than those using the cumulative executive stock option grants.  
Results for the determinants of single year executive stock option grants are similar to 
those for the cumulative grants, except for the insignificance of the coefficients for 
LN(S) and K/S.  This suggests that the value enhancement benefits of executive stock 
option grants are less evident in the single year executive stock option grants compared 
to the cumulative stock option grants.  One plausible reason is that executive stock 
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option grants are adopted by firms as a medium term strategy as opposed to a short-
term compensation tool. 47 
Appendices 8 and 9 present the analyses of the relationship between single year 
executive stock option grants and firm performance using cross-sectional and panel 
data respectively.  Contrary to my findings for cumulative executive stock option 
grants, the results for the relationship between single year executive stock option 
grants and firm performance are insignificant for most regressions.  Again, it supports 
our argument that firms adopt executive stock options as a medium term strategy.  
Panels A and B of Appendix 10 show the analyses of the relationship between single 
year executive stock option grants and firm performance using the cross-sectional data 
and panel data respectively, after inclusion of instrumental variables.  Again, results 
are mainly insignificant. 
 
5.5.2 Tests on Total Equity Grants 
I repeat my analyses using total equity grants, denoted as ST_CEX.  Total 
equity grant is defined as the average of the value sum of stock and stock options 
granted to the firm's top five executives.  I take the natural logarithm of the variable, 
denoted as LN(ST_CEX) for analyses.  The results for total equity grants are 
summarised in Appendices 11 to 15.  The adjusted R-square values for tests on total 
equity grants are generally lower than those on executive stock option grants, thus 
suggesting a relatively weaker specification for the regressions of total equity grants. 
                                                 
47 I have not lagged the determinants of executive stock option grants and stock option grants. This 
could have weakened my results in the analyses of single year option grants. However, I have added the 
single year analyses as part of the robustness tests for the main findings, which account for the 
cumulative (and lagged) effect of pas t year option grants. The main finding of the U-shaped relationship 
between executive stock option grants and firm performance is robust, having fully accounted for the 
lagged effects of part year grants.  
The Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants and the Link Between Executive Stock Option 
Grants and Firm Performance. 
Chapter 5: Analyses and Findings 
 
 68 
Appendices 11 and 12 show the analyses of the determinants of total equity 
grants using cross-sectional and panel data respectively.  Results are similar to those 
for executive stock option grants, except that the coefficients for RD/K are mainly 
insignificant.  In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients for SIG is smaller and 
insignificant for most regressions using total equity grants.   
Appendices 13 and 14 show the analyses of the relationship between total 
equity grants and firm performance using cross-sectional and panel data respectively.  
From Appendix 13, I observe a significant U-shaped relationship between total equity 
grants and firm performance for the cross-sectional analyses from 1998 to 2000 at the 
5% level.  This is consistent with my findings for executive stock option grants.  
However, unlike my analyses for executive stock option grants, the U-shaped 
relationship is significant in fewer regressions.  The relationship becomes insignificant 
when firm heterogeneity is controlled for using panel data with fixed effects.   
Panels A and B of Appendix 15 show the analyses of the relationship between 
total equity grants and firm performance using cross-sectional and panel data 
respectively, after inclusion of instrumental variables.  Unlike the results for executive 
stock option grants, I do not see a decrease in the significance of the coefficients for 
total equity grants, and this is especially so for the cross-sectional data.  One possible 
explanation is that size and volatility may not be good instrumental variables for total 
equity grants, hence the endogeneity problem in total equity grants is not fully 
corrected for.  This has implications for future research to examine more appropriate 
instrumental variables for total equity grants. 
To summarise, my results for total equity grants differ from those for executive 
stock option grants.  In particular, I observe that the relationship between total equity 
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grants and firm performance is captured in the cross-sectional analyses but not the 
analyses using panel data with fixed effects.  In contrast, the relationship between 
executive stock option grants and firm performance remains significant for analyses 
using both the cross-sectional and panel data.  One plausible reason is that the 
managerial stock ownership portion of the total equity grants changes slowly from year 
to year within a firm (Zhou (2001)).  As a result, the analyses using panel data with 
fixed effects would fail to capture any meaningful relationship between total equity 
grants and firm performance.  
The Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants and the Link Between Executive Stock Option 
Grants and Firm Performance. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 70 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
In Section 6.1, I present a summary of my results.  The limitations of the study 
are discussed in Section 6.2.  Finally, Section 6.3 discusses the implications of my 
study, which leads to suggestions for future research.  
 
6.1 Summary of Study 
Considerable research has presented evidence on the relationship between 
managerial stock ownership and firm performance, with some studies showing an 
inverted U-shaped functional form of the relationship between the two variables (for 
example, McConell and Servaes (1990)).  However, recent empirical studies show that 
this relationship is insignificant, after correcting for the endogeneity in the 
compensation variable (for example, Himmelberg et al. (1999)).   
Given the controversy on the relationship between managerial stock ownership 
and firm performance, it is interesting to investigate the relationship between executive 
stock option grants and firm performance.  Besides, as few studies provide evidence on 
such a relationship, my study fills this gap, by empirically examining what factors 
drive executive stock option grants, and how these factors affect its relationship with 
firm performance.   
My study has two main contributions.  First, it provides evidence on the 
functional form of the relationship between executive stock option grants and firm 
performance.  I find a functional form of firm performance that is U-shaped relative to 
executive stock option grants, even after correcting for the endogeneity of the 
executive stock option grant variable.  The results suggest that firms granting either 
few or many executive stock options are associated with high Tobin's Q.  Together 
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with my assumption that every firm tend to work towards an optimal level of executive 
stock option, my study shows that very small or very large amount of executive stock 
option grants may not always be detrimental to the shareholders, as long as the amount 
of executive stock option grants is optimal in the firms’ contracting environment. The 
second contribution of my study is that my results for executive stock option grants are 
robust, even when using panel data with fixed effects.  This is contrary to the findings 
for managerial stock ownership.  The likely reason is that executive stock option grants 
vary significantly not only between firms but also within a firm.  Hence, even if 
controlling for fixed effects would remove any cross-sectional relationship between 
firms, I still observe significant results for my analyses.     
To investigate the determinants of executive stock option grants, my study tests 
hypotheses concerning value enhancement, risk taking, tax saving, signalling and cash 
conservation motivations for executive stock option grants.  Controlling for these 
determinants, I investigate if executive stock option grants are associated with firm 
performance.  Fixed effects are also used to test if endogeneity exists in executive 
stock option grants.  Instrumental variables are adopted as an alternative means to 
address the problem of endogeneity of the compensation va riable. 
The results for my cross-sectional analyses of the determinants of executive 
stock option grants support the value enhancement hypothesis, with coefficients for 
firm size, capital intensity, growth opportunities and R&D expenditure being 
statistically significant.  For analyses using panel data, my results also support the 
value enhancement hypothesis, with coefficients for firm size, capital intensity and 
growth opportunities being statistically significant.  These findings are consistent with 
agency theory in that firms grant stock options to provide value enhancement benefits 
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to executives.  In addition, my results for tests on the signalling motivation for 
executive stock option grants are significant, suggesting that firms grant executives 
more stock options to signal positive price sensitive information.  This observation 
persists in analyses using cross-sectional and panel data.  
My study finds a significant U-shaped relationship between executive stock 
option grants and firm performance in ana lyses using cross-sectional and panel data.  
However, the observed relationship becomes insignificant with the inclusion of 
instrumental variables in the cross-sectional analyses.  The robustness tests on single 
year executive stock option grants and total equity grants yield insignificant results.   
 
6.2 Limitations of Study 
Four caveats are in order.  The first relates to choice of my instrumental 
variables for executive stock option grants, which are difficult to find.  Although my 
results suggest that my instrumental variables may have addressed the problem of 
endogeneity, I do not rule out the possibility that more appropriate instrumental 
variables may exist.   
The second caveat relates to the question of causality of the relation between 
executive stock option grants and firm performance.  I qualify that my results do not 
mean that firm performance would improve if firms provide few or many executive 
stock option grants.  This is because my study merely focuses on the equilibrium 
relation between the two variables, and not the cause-and-effect relationship between 
the two variables.     
The third caveat relates to the existence of alternative compensation 
mechanisms that may affect firm performance.  I do not rule out the possibility that 
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other compensation mechanisms may be associated with firm performance.  Also, use 
of one such mechanism need not be directly related to firm performance as a few 
mechanisms may be used interchangeably or jointly. 
Finally, my results may vary with market phases.  This study draws its data 
from the ten-year period that covers the bullish market phases of the late 1990s.  The 
findings that point to an U-shaped relationship between the use of executive stock 
option grants and firm performance yield inferences that are consistent  with the bubble 
that developed in the telecom-media-technology sectors in the late 1990s. 
 
6.3 Implications of Study and Directions for Future Research 
There are several implications from my study.  First, my results imply the 
endogeneity of executive stock option grants.  This supports the literature on the 
endogeneity of the compensation variables.  Future research should take into 
consideration such endogeneity of the compensation variables.  Furthermore, the 
significance of the signalling motivation for executive stock option grants implies that 
executive stock option grants can be a credible signal for favourable news.  Future 
studies can investigate if firms also use managerial stock ownership as a signal to 
investors.  
Second, my observation of an U-shaped relationship between executive stock 
option grants and firm performance implies that executive stock option grants may not 
always be the best compensation tool for all companies.  This is because firms granting 
few executive stock options are similar to those granting many executive stock options 
in that both group of firms can be associated with high Tobin's Q, as long as the level 
of option grants is optimal in the firm's contracting environment.  This does not deny 
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the importance of agency theory between shareholders and managers because 
consistent with the prediction of principal-agent model, executive stock option grants 
are explained by the key variables in a firm’s contracting environment (Himmelberg et 
al. (1999)).  This is also consistent with the concept of endogeneity.  Furthermore, the 
finding of an U-shaped relationship has implications for future research.  Future study 
on executive compensation, in particular executive stock option grants, should not 
assume a positive or inverted U-shaped function between executive stock option grants 
and firm performance.  Also, my findings do not imply a cause-and-effect relationship 
between the two variables.  Future research can test for any reverse causality between 
executive stock option grants and firm performance.  It would also be interesting to re-
evaluate the U-shaped relationship using data for periods after the technology bubble 
has burst. 
Third, the significance in results for analyses of executive stock option grants 
using either cross-sectional or panel data implies that any of the two specification 
models can be used for analyses of executive stock option grants.  However, analyses 
using instrumental variables result in weaker and less significant specification of the 
executive stock option grants and firm performance relationship.  Future studies may 
have to incorporate more refined instrumental variables in their model specifications.   
Finally, my results imply that managerial stock ownership and executive stock 
option grants exhibit a different relationship with firm performance.  However, as 
compensation mechanisms may be used interdependently, regressions of firm 
performance on one or two compensation mechanisms are difficult to interpret.  Future 
research can identify other compensation mechanisms and model the simultaneous 
choice of individual mechanisms in greater detail (Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)). 
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Appendix 1: A Example of the GUASS Program Codes for Pooled and Panel Data 
Analyses 
 
/* -- set output file  -- */ 
cls; 
clear all; 
output file = Panel.OUT reset; 
 
print; 
print " +------------------------------------------------------+"; 
print " | Basic Panel Data Estimation  |"; 
print " | Version 1.3, Mar 2000  |"; 
print " | Olvar Bergland   |"; 
print " +------------------------------------------------------+"; 
print; 
 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
/* --  DATA SECTION                                                -- */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
/* -- load data from ASCII file and initialize variables        -- */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
 
load rawdat[830,26] = E:\gauss\beifen\firm.csv;       
 
/* -- initialize some constants */ 
n =  83;              /*    Number of Firms       83 */ 
t =  10;               /*    Number of Years */ 
k =  18;              /*    Number of Regressors*/ 
 
/* -- set up the proper matrices with data */ 
y = rawdat[.,5];    /* y - the dependent variable vector     */ 
x = rawdat[.,9:26];    /* x - the independent variables matrix */ 
 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
/* --  DATA PREPARATION SECTION             -- */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
 
nt = n*t;   /*    Total # of observations, 83x10 */ 
k1 = k+1;   /*    # of parameters + 1 constant */ 
nk = n*k1;   /*    panel # of parameters + constant */ 
n1 = n-1;    /*    # of pane - 1    */ 
 
in = eye(n);  /* diagonal matrix of size n-by-n */ 
jn = ones(n,1);  /* n-dimensional vector of ones */ 
it = eye(t);  /* diagonal matrix of size t-by-t */ 
jt = ones(t,1);  /* t-dimensional vector of ones */ 
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Appendix 1: A Example of the GUASS Program Codes for Pooled and Panel Data 
Analyses - continued 
 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
/* -- pooled model                                       -- */ 








/* -- use matrix manipulation even for the basic OLS estimator        */ 
 
xp  = ones(nt,1)~x;             /* add the constant term            */ 
xxi = invpd(xp'xp);              /* keep the (x'x) -^1 matrix         */ 
bp  = xxi*xp'y;                   /* estimated parameters            */ 
ep  = y - xp*bp;                  /* residuals from the pooled model */ 
sp  = ep'ep/(nt-k1);             /* variance of residuals            */ 




ESS = bp'xp'*y-nt*meanc(y)^2; 
@RSS = y'y-bp'xp'*y;@ 
RSS = ep'ep; 
F_Stat = (ESS/(k1-t))/(RSS/(nt-k1)); 
p_val = cdffc(F_Stat,k1-t,nt-k1); 
R_Sq  = 1-(RSS/(nt-k1))/((RSS+ESS)/(nt-t)); 
 
 
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------- */ 
/* -- fixed-effects model                             -- */ 








/* -- within regression:                                             */ 
print; 
print "---------------- within regression (LSDV) -----------------"; 
 
/* -- average over time                                              */ 
dt = it - jt*jt'/t; 
yi = (in .*. dt)*y; 
xi = (in .*. dt)*x;  
 
xxi = invpd(moment(xi,0));  /* keep the (x'x) -^1 matrix        */ 
bw  = xxi*xi'yi;                   /* estimated parameters          */ 
ew  = yi - xi*bw;                 /* residuals                         */ 
sw  = ew'ew/(nt-n-k);          /* variance of residuals            */ 
se  = sqrt(sw*(diag(xxi)));   /* standard errors on parameters    */ 
prnt_ols(bw,se,sw,nt); 
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Appendix 1: A Example of the GUASS Program Codes for Pooled and Panel Data 
Analyses - continued 
 
TSSp  = yi'yi-nt*meanc(yi)^2; 
RSSp = ew'ew; 
ESSp  = TSSp-RSSp; 
F_Statp = (ESSp/(4))/(RSSp/(nt-k-n)); 
p_valp = cdffc(F_Statp,t,nt-k); 
R_Sqp = 1-(RSSp/(nt-k-n))/((TSSp)/(t*k+n)); 
 
vfe = sw*xxi; 
 
 
/* -- average over individual units                                  */ 
ym = (in .*. jt')*y/t;           /* average y for each unit          */ 
xm = (in .*. jt')*x/t;           /* average x for each unit          */ 
 
/* -- calculate fixed effects                                        */ 
mu = meanc(y) - bw'meanc(x);     /* grand mean/overall constant      */ 
ap = (ym - xm*bw) - mu;          /* individual dummy variables       */ 
 
/* -- report results                                                 */ 
vnam = 0 $+ "I_" $+ ftocv(seqa(1,1,n),floor(log(n)),0); 
omat = vnam~ap; 
mask = 0~1; 
let fmt[2,3] = "-*.*s" 9 8 "*.*lf" 12 6; 
print; 
print; 
print "--- fixed effects ---"; 
print; 
print "Individual   Estimate"; 
print "---------------------"; 






ft = ((ep'ep - ew'ew)/(n-1))/((ew'ew)/(nt-n-k)); 
format /rd 8,4; 
print "F-test for no fixed effects:" ft; 






print "Summary of Pool Regression"; 
print "F-Stat  :: " F_Stat; 
print "p-value :: " p_val;  
print "Adj R-Square:: " R_Sq; 
print; 
print; 
print "Summary of Panel Regression"; 
print "F-Stat  :: " F_Statp; 
print "p-value :: " p_valp; 
print "Adj R-Square:: " R_Sqp; 
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Appendix 1: A Example of the GUASS Program Codes for Pooled and Panel Data 
Analyses - continued 
    
proc(0) = prnt_ols(b,s,v,n);  
 
   local k, t, p; 
   local vnam, omat, mask, fmt; 
 
   k = rows(b); 
 
   print; 
   print ftos(n, "Number of obs:  %*.*lf",20,0);  
   print ftos(k, "Number of par:  %*.*lf",20,0);  
   print ftos(v, "Var residuals:  %*.*lf",20,3); 
   print; 
   t = b ./ s;                    /* t -values                        */ 
   p = 2*cdftc(abs(t ),n-k);      /* p-values                        */ 
 
   vnam = 0 $+ "X_" $+ ftocv(seqa(1,1,k),floor(log(k)),0); 
   omat = vnam~b~s~t~p; 
   mask = 0~1~1~1~1; 
   let fmt[5,3] = "-*.*s"  9 8 
                  "*.*lf" 12 6 
                  "*.*lf" 12 6 
                  "*.*lf" 12 6 
                  "*.*lf" 10 3; 
   print "                         Standard                  Prob"; 
   print "Variable     Estimate      Error      t -value      >|t|"; 
   print "-------------------------------------------------------"; 
   call printfm(omat,mask,fmt);  
   print "-------------------------------------------------------"; 
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Appendix 2 : Definition of High Technology Industry 
This study adopts the high technology industry definition from the American Electronics Association 
(AeA). AeA is U.S.'s largest high technology trade association. It represents more than 3,000 companies 
with 1.8 million employees in almost every spectrum of the high tech industry. AeA uses 45 SIC codes 
to define the high-technology industry. The definition consists of SIC codes that fall into three broad 
categories: (1) high-technology manufacturing, (2) communications services, and software and (3) 
computer-related services. However, these SIC codes do not comprehensively cover the entire high-
technology industry as the structure of the SIC system is limited.  
Category SIC Code Description 
High-Technology Manufacturing 







Computer Storage Devices 
Computer Terminals  
Computer Peripherals  
Calculating and Accounting Machines 
Office Machines 
Consumer Electronics 3651 
3652 
Household Audio and Video Equipment 
Phonographic Records and Prerecorded Tapes 
Communications Equipment 3661 
3663 
3669 
Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus 
Radio, TV Broadcast and Com. Equipment 
Other Communications Equipment 










Printed Circuit Boards 
Electronic Capacitors 
Electronic Resistors 
Electronic Coils, Transformers, and Inductors  
Electronic Connectors 
Other Electronic Components  
Semiconductors 3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices 








Environmental Controls  
Process Control Instruments  
Fluid Meters and Counting Devices 
Instruments to Measure Electricity 
Laboratory Analytical Instruments 
Other Measuring and Controlling Devices 
Photonics 3827 
3861 
Optical Instruments and Lenses 
Photographic Equipment and Lenses 
Defense Electronics 3812 Search & Navigation Sys., Instruments, and 
Equipment 
Electromedical Equipment 3844 
3845 
X-Ray App. & Related Irradiation App. 









Telegraph, Other Message Communications 
Cable and Other Pay Television Services 
Other Communications Services 
Software and Computer-Related Services  
Software Services 7371 
7372 
7373 
Computer Programming Services 
Prepackaged Softwa re 
Computer Integrated Systems Design 





Computer Processing and Data Preparation 
Information Retrieval Services 
Computer Facilities Management Services 





Computer Rental and Leasing 
Computer Maintenance and Repair 
Other Computer-Related Services 
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Appendix 5: Analysis on Firm Profile 
 
The first part of my study concludes that the value-enhancement (in particular 
size, growth opportunities and R&D intensity) and signalling motivations of executive 
stock option grants are significant.  The second part of my study finds a U-shaped 
relationship between executive stock option grants and firm performance.  These 
findings suggest that large firms with high growth opportunities, R&D expenditure and 
more insider stock purchases tend to lie on the right end of the U-shaped function, and 
vice versa.  In order to understand how the link between executive stock option grants 
and firm performance is associated with the specific firm profiles, I examine the 
profile of firms that lie on the two extreme ends of the U-shaped curve for the two 
most recent sample years – 2000 and 2001.  The sample firms are categorised into 
three categories (low, medium and high) for each of their data on firm performance, 
size, growth opportunities, R&D expenditure and insider stock purchases, with each 
category having equal number of firms.  
 
A closer examination of the firms for the year 2000 shows that 79% of the 
firms with strong performance (i.e. firms that exist in “high” category of firm 
performance) are categorised either “low” or “high” for their data on R&D expenditure 
and insider stock purchases.  Similarly, about 70% of the firms with strong 
performance have the size and growth opportunities data that lie on the two extreme 
categories respectively.   Results for the year 2001 show similar trend. 
 
My observations of the firm characteristics support findings of the first and 
second part of my study.  I find that firms with extreme values of size, growth 
opportunities, R&D expenditure and insider purchases tend to lie on the two extreme 
ends of the U-shaped function of executive stock option grants and firm performance.  
However, future studies could adopt other methodology and examine other firm 
characteristics not discussed in this study to confirm this point. 
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Q LN(CEX) LN(S) K/S EBIT/S I/K RD/K A/K SIG LTDUM HTDUM LN(INS) CashSF IntBD
1992 505 Mean 1.919 13.629 20.411 0.969 0.926 0.134 0.094 0.049 0.060 0.036 0.651 0.079 -0.173 1.278
Std Dev 1.201 1.319 1.718 1.205 4.666 0.114 0.298 0.146 0.179 0.186 0.477 0.857 0.146 4.852
1993 753 Mean 2.001 13.755 20.377 0.980 0.745 0.146 0.093 0.046 0.045 0.029 0.696 0.199 -0.173 1.104
Std Dev 1.144 1.237 1.653 2.684 2.813 0.116 0.278 0.149 0.058 0.169 0.460 1.422 0.179 4.853
1994 852 Mean 1.782 13.700 20.516 0.857 0.838 0.142 0.089 0.030 0.040 0.020 0.766 0.702 -0.176 0.881
Std Dev 0.961 1.252 1.561 1.075 2.729 0.104 0.242 0.164 0.049 0.140 0.423 2.575 0.197 3.067
1995 925 Mean 1.953 14.023 20.661 0.825 0.983 0.140 0.089 0.028 0.044 0.025 0.702 5.303 -0.166 1.251
Std Dev 1.213 1.372 1.587 1.104 3.664 0.099 0.239 0.122 0.070 0.156 0.458 6.004 0.189 6.671
1996 1131 Mean 2.173 14.370 20.669 0.785 1.044 0.154 0.125 0.036 0.055 0.030 0.701 8.930 -0.189 0.873
Std Dev 1.602 1.482 1.640 1.026 4.458 0.127 0.450 0.164 0.071 0.171 0.458 7.563 0.176 4.056
1997 1187 Mean 2.346 14.620 20.606 0.773 0.996 0.161 0.146 0.044 0.065 0.040 0.672 10.587 -0.183 0.978
Std Dev 1.988 1.334 1.648 0.998 3.563 0.182 0.413 0.213 0.088 0.197 0.470 7.462 0.201 4.152
1998 1257 Mean 2.404 14.583 20.655 0.804 0.963 0.157 0.172 0.042 0.105 0.051 0.632 11.541 -0.193 0.864
Std Dev 3.538 1.437 1.598 1.138 3.689 0.108 0.842 0.206 0.161 0.220 0.482 6.959 0.175 4.760
1999 1282 Mean 2.885 14.721 20.752 0.842 1.085 0.152 0.147 0.045 0.111 0.040 0.633 12.623 -0.187 1.135
Std Dev 5.112 1.606 1.563 1.254 4.434 0.119 0.386 0.217 0.124 0.196 0.482 6.311 0.215 5.370
2000 1220 Mean 2.334 14.864 20.963 0.731 0.896 0.158 0.157 0.046 0.180 0.047 0.631 14.011 -0.168 1.053
Std Dev 2.455 1.571 1.541 1.041 3.743 0.173 0.433 0.191 0.175 0.211 0.483 5.320 0.196 4.165
2001 1009 Mean 2.091 14.891 21.077 0.716 0.671 0.132 0.151 0.043 0.137 0.067 0.550 14.811 -0.189 1.381
Std Dev 1.397 1.285 1.543 0.846 2.610 0.096 0.459 0.208 0.135 0.251 0.498 3.846 0.162 6.927
1992 - 10121 Mean 2.245 14.411 20.698 0.813 0.927 0.149 0.132 0.041 0.090 0.040 0.660 9.000 -0.181 1.063
2001 Std Dev 2.647 1.480 1.610 1.272 3.714 0.130 0.463 0.186 0.129 0.195 0.474 7.669 0.187 4.999
This table summarises the descriptive statistics for the cross-sectional data set. The sample size, mean and standard deviation (Std Dev) of each variable for each
year are presented below. The sample consists of 10,121 observations for the 10 years from 1992 to 2001. Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in
Table 1.




Q LN(CEX) LN(S) K/S EBIT/S I/K RD/K A/K SIG LTDUM HTDUM LN(INS) CashSF IntBD
1992 83 Mean 1.919 13.703 20.627 0.932 2.293 0.139 0.102 0.051 0.092 0.024 0.651 0.138 -0.177 0.316
Std Dev 1.229 1.157 1.847 1.062 10.911 0.114 0.262 0.137 0.379 0.154 0.480 1.255 0.134 14.332
1993 83 Mean 2.015 13.996 20.765 0.909 0.490 0.139 0.110 0.045 0.048 0.000 0.735 0.367 -0.177 0.728
Std Dev 1.273 1.050 1.717 1.018 1.429 0.108 0.297 0.120 0.052 0.000 0.444 1.911 0.160 2.800
1994 83 Mean 1.799 13.931 20.896 0.902 0.963 0.135 0.131 0.035 0.041 0.024 0.783 0.581 -0.187 0.951
Std Dev 0.948 1.145 1.677 1.008 3.400 0.096 0.377 0.117 0.044 0.154 0.415 2.086 0.143 2.601
1995 83 Mean 2.031 14.364 21.029 0.913 0.453 0.135 0.122 0.037 0.043 0.036 0.735 9.141 -0.192 0.749
Std Dev 1.207 1.173 1.629 1.072 1.391 0.098 0.358 0.108 0.061 0.188 0.444 5.399 0.133 2.905
1996 83 Mean 1.991 14.685 21.124 0.898 2.485 0.131 0.103 0.035 0.045 0.024 0.699 13.271 -0.203 0.304
Std Dev 0.965 1.077 1.624 0.992 19.227 0.088 0.291 0.103 0.049 0.154 0.462 5.326 0.151 1.869
1997 83 Mean 2.139 15.041 21.248 0.858 0.270 0.132 0.099 0.037 0.047 0.036 0.639 14.506 -0.191 0.292
Std Dev 1.068 1.127 1.541 0.850 0.591 0.082 0.263 0.107 0.041 0.188 0.483 5.110 0.195 0.711
1998 83 Mean 2.125 14.885 21.342 0.952 0.605 0.132 0.088 0.032 0.079 0.060 0.675 14.375 -0.183 0.214
Std Dev 1.339 1.387 1.532 1.110 4.141 0.076 0.234 0.100 0.062 0.239 0.471 4.746 0.182 0.406
1999 83 Mean 2.380 14.934 21.461 0.974 0.503 0.116 0.101 0.031 0.079 0.036 0.723 14.515 -0.195 0.350
Std Dev 2.596 1.522 1.479 1.203 2.386 0.075 0.257 0.092 0.050 0.188 0.450 4.815 0.160 1.133
2000 83 Mean 2.235 15.142 21.665 0.797 0.389 0.115 0.101 0.033 0.122 0.048 0.614 14.524 -0.186 0.498
Std Dev 1.965 1.390 1.405 0.798 1.721 0.076 0.275 0.099 0.099 0.215 0.490 4.807  2.523
2001 83 Mean 2.065 15.195 21.687 0.889 0.268 0.105 0.080 0.027 0.084 0.072 0.627 14.643 -0.201 0.651
Std Dev 1.418 1.270 1.380 0.972 0.865 0.066 0.192 0.073 0.065 0.261 0.487 4.679 0.137 4.386
1992 - 830 Mean 2.070 14.588 21.184 0.902 0.872 0.128 0.104 0.036 0.068 0.036 0.403 9.606 -0.189 0.505
2001 Std Dev 1.482 1.338 1.618 1.010 7.291 0.089 0.284 0.106 0.135 0.187 0.927 7.569 0.158 5.072
This table summarises the descriptive statistics for my first balanced panel data set. The sample size, mean and standard deviation (Std Dev) of each variable for each
year are presented below. The sample consists of a total of 830 observations for the 10 years from 1992 to 2001. Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented
in Table 1.




Q LN(CEX) LN(S) K/S EBIT/S I/K RD/K A/K SIG LTDUM HTDUM LN(INS) CashSF IntBD
1997 409 Mean 2.363 14.774 20.790 0.758 1.481 0.153 0.146 0.042 0.067 0.034 0.663 15.032 -0.210 1.770
Std Dev 1.469 1.207 1.592 0.960 11.700 0.104 0.390 0.263 0.091 0.182 0.473 3.861 0.164 16.888
1998 409 Mean 2.350 14.739 20.921 0.798 0.994 0.152 0.189 0.046 0.090 0.054 0.655 15.035 -0.201 1.861
Std Dev 1.766 1.335 1.541 1.063 6.669 0.098 1.153 0.290 0.069 0.226 0.476 3.615 0.154 20.419
1999 409 Mean 2.525 14.852 21.054 0.810 0.871 0.137 0.138 0.043 0.100 0.042 0.658 15.014 -0.207 0.890
Std Dev 2.437 1.467 1.499 1.064 3.221 0.093 0.418 0.270 0.099 0.200 0.475 3.757 0.150 5.994
2000 409 Mean 2.525 14.852 21.054 0.810 0.871 0.137 0.138 0.043 0.100 0.042 0.658 15.014 -0.207 0.890
Std Dev 2.437 1.467 1.499 1.064 3.221 0.093 0.418 0.270 0.099 0.200 0.475 3.757 0.150 5.994
2001 409 Mean 2.029 14.954 21.247 0.754 0.533 0.120 0.138 0.037 0.117 0.056 0.570 15.066 -0.183 0.811
Std Dev 1.273 1.237 1.474 0.846 2.471 0.077 0.452 0.233 0.110 0.231 0.496 3.489 0.153 13.149
1997 - 2045 Mean 2.359 14.834 21.013 0.786 0.950 0.140 0.150 0.042 0.095 0.056 0.570 15.032 -0.202 1.245
2001 Std Dev 1.944 1.348 1.528 1.003 6.454 0.094 0.638 0.266 0.096 0.231 0.496 3.694 0.155 13.756
This table summarises the descriptive statistics for my second balanced panel data set. The sample size, mean and standard deviation (Std Dev) of each variable for each
year are presented below. The sample consists of a total of 2,045 observations for the 5 years from 1997 to 2001. Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in
Table 1.
Table 6: Correlation Coefficient Matrix for the Variables in the Year 1992
Q LN(CEX) LN(S) K/S EBIT/S I/K RD/K RDUM A/K ADUM SIG SDUM LTDUM HTDUM LN(INS) INSDUM CashSF IntBD
Q 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LN(CEX) 0.292 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LN(S) -0.334 0.100 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
K/S -0.045 -0.114 -0.271 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EBIT/S -0.005 -0.014 0.096 -0.494 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I/K 0.250 0.231 -0.350 -0.028 -0.048 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - -
RD/K 0.384 0.147 -0.464 0.161 -0.027 0.265 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - -
RDUM 0.179 0.127 -0.043 -0.094 -0.022 0.066 0.338 1.000 - - - - - - - - - -
A/K 0.101 0.144 -0.006 -0.163 0.008 0.157 0.030 0.052 1.000 - - - - - - - - -
ADUM 0.188 0.256 0.074 -0.220 0.021 0.153 0.025 0.022 0.421 1.000 - - - - - - - -
SIG 0.037 0.111 -0.113 -0.030 0.011 0.041 0.064 0.055 0.020 0.012 1.000 - - - - - - -
SDUM 0.004 0.057 0.095 -0.071 0.038 -0.002 -0.057 0.020 -0.026 0.058 0.223 1.000 - - - - - -
LTDUM -0.048 0.015 -0.092 0.104 -0.215 -0.020 0.088 0.115 -0.046 -0.058 -0.001 0.002 1.000 - - - - -
HTDUM 0.007 0.069 0.142 -0.123 0.035 0.016 -0.110 -0.146 0.132 0.052 0.035 0.015 -0.269 1.000 - - - -
LN(INS) -0.009 0.043 0.064 -0.007 0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.028 0.167 0.042 -0.015 0.060 -0.018 0.014 1.000 - - -
INSDUM -0.008 0.005 0.042 -0.018 0.002 -0.012 -0.011 0.027 0.125 0.042 -0.016 0.065 -0.020 0.032 0.927 1.000 - -
CashSF -0.215 -0.136 0.086 0.095 -0.110 -0.167 -0.015 0.038 0.021 -0.035 -0.028 -0.005 0.098 -0.106 0.006 0.012 1.000 -
IntBD -0.014 -0.007 -0.045 -0.060 0.027 0.053 -0.010 0.025 -0.018 -0.034 -0.019 -0.091 0.058 0.012 -0.006 -0.006 -0.014 1.000
This table shows the correlation coefficient matrix for the key variables for the 505 firms in the year 1992. Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1.
Correlation coefficient matrices for other sample years are available upon request. 
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
LN(S) -0.9799 -1.3519 -0.3641 -0.7523 -0.8182 -1.5639 -1.9548 -1.3209 -1.1084 -0.3538
(0.089) (0.011) (0.494) (0.145) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.013) (0.436)
[LN(S)]^2 0.0293 0.0381 0.0147 0.0259 0.0283 0.0450 0.0537 0.0382 0.0335 0.0152
(0.035) (0.003) (0.248) (0.035) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.151)
K/S -0.3188 -0.0955 -0.1310 -0.0639 -0.2176 -0.4426 -0.2275 -0.0509 0.0254 -0.1021
(0.003) (0.027) (0.148) (0.447) (0.011) (0.000) (0.002) (0.411) (0.641) (0.297)
(K/S)^2 0.0414 0.0011 0.0104 0.0038 0.0293 0.0666 0.0142 0.0092 0.0032 0.0262
(0.014) (0.093) (0.524) (0.777) (0.053) (0.000) (0.218) (0.280) (0.557) (0.275)
EBIT/S 0.0264 -0.0137 0.0113 0.0256 0.0100 0.0169 0.0106 -0.0111 -0.0068 -0.0092
(0.052) (0.448) (0.517) (0.061) (0.317) (0.131) (0.323) (0.235) (0.491) (0.485)
I/K 1.7616 2.2987 2.6424 3.7524 2.5959 0.8063 2.2512 2.2588 0.8523 2.3603
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RD/K 0.4669 0.2905 1.2625 1.2866 0.4411 0.3428 0.1941 0.7683 0.4649 0.3965
(0.041) (0.133) (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RDUM -0.0063 0.0740 0.1798 0.0828 0.0993 0.0830 0.0559 0.2378 0.0377 0.2001
(0.958) (0.436) (0.048) (0.368) (0.221) (0.264) (0.441) (0.003) (0.611) (0.004)
A/K -0.0065 -0.2540 -0.0535 0.1284 0.1145 0.0558 -0.4850 -0.3097 0.1408 -0.3206
(0.988) (0.412) (0.839) (0.741) (0.658) (0.746) (0.035) (0.088) (0.461) (0.089)
ADUM 0.4522 0.2477 0.0518 -0.1316 -0.0638 -0.0256 0.0889 0.0615 -0.0733 0.0973
(0.000) (0.012) (0.661) (0.307) (0.554) (0.775) (0.324) (0.484) (0.360) (0.188)
SIG 80.0094 212.4364 -160.4143 -161.9606 28.0681 43.2682 -12.4688 157.7535 103.1513 18.5346
(0.007) (0.022) (0.151) (0.021) (0.689) (0.344) (0.584) (0.000) (0.000) (0.542)
SDUM 0.0554 -0.1642 0.0694 0.0794 0.0148 -0.0585 0.0862 -0.0687 0.1637 0.1920
(0.639) (0.138) (0.526) (0.459) (0.893) (0.564) (0.423) (0.606) (0.325) (0.401)
LTDUM 0.4146 0.1809 0.0368 0.2956 -0.2751 -0.0788 -0.1837 -0.0483 -0.1249 0.0533
(0.162) (0.480) (0.899) (0.267) (0.233) (0.658) (0.253) (0.794) (0.444) (0.684)
HTDUM 0.1271 -0.0177 0.0347 0.0812 -0.2716 -0.0865 -0.1054 -0.0699 -0.1580 -0.0123
(0.278) (0.852) (0.720) (0.376) (0.002) (0.254) (0.155) (0.355) (0.028) (0.852)
LN(INS) 0.3192 -0.0893 0.0322 0.0757 0.1460 0.1608 0.2457 0.3223 0.3275 0.2577
(0.054) (0.594) (0.536) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INSDUM -2.6735 0.9619 -0.5541 -0.7050 -2.1276 -2.4149 -3.6466 -4.8197 -4.8166 -4.0434
(0.060) (0.573) (0.276) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CashSF -1.4751 -1.0192 -1.2247 -0.5121 -1.5919 -1.2529 -1.0930 -0.9241 -1.2374 -0.7251
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IntBD -0.0213 -0.0041 -0.0134 -0.0127 -0.0221 -0.0240 -0.0234 0.0016 -0.0236 -0.0075
(0.062) (0.645) (0.365) (0.066) (0.021) (0.006) (0.002) (0.822) (0.005) (0.116)
N 505 753 852 925 1131 1187 1257 1282 1220 1009
Adj R sq 0.2119 0.1575 0.1822 0.2354 0.2853 0.2657 0.3204 0.4076 0.4721 0.4106
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of executive stock option grants, CEX , on the
explanatory variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional data.
Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. This table reports the estimated coefficients for
the explanatory variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable
definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1.
Table 7: Analyses of the Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants (CEX ) Using
Cross-Sectional Data
Variables Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects
LN(S) -0.8376 0.3815 -0.5087 -1.3292 2.4784 -1.1234
(0.060) (0.560) (0.690) (0.000) (0.000) (0.466)
[LN(S)]^2 0.0271 0.0021 0.0237 0.0374 -0.0499 0.0335
(0.009) (0.897) (0.440) (0.000) (0.003) (0.357)
K/S -0.2745 -0.5731 -0.2907 -0.0539 -0.0651 -0.0486
(0.005) (0.006) (0.356) (0.357) (0.683) (0.863)
(K/S)^2 0.0406 0.0688 0.0312 -0.0116 0.0130 0.0091
(0.059) (0.021) (0.429) (0.300) (0.502) (0.791)
EBIT/S 0.0019 0.0064 0.0078 0.0001 -0.0023 -0.0041
(0.722) (0.097) (0.718) (0.981) (0.571) (0.733)
I/K 2.7424 0.3718 0.1944 2.2739 0.6572 -0.0067
(0.000) (0.372) (0.756) (0.000) (0.025) (0.990)
RD/K 1.2109 -0.1869 1.0044 0.1362 0.0174 -0.4033
(0.000) (0.477) (0.157) (0.005) (0.655) (0.305)
RDUM -0.0468 -0.6427 -0.7773 0.2162 0.0659 -0.3277
(0.572) (0.003) (0.012) (0.000) (0.712) (0.172)
A/K -0.7627 2.4923 3.4542 0.1031 -0.6019 -0.1805
(0.069) (0.012) (0.007) (0.364) (0.039) (0.595)
ADUM 0.2160 -0.3686 -0.3220 0.0464 0.1903 -0.1875
(0.024) (0.001) (0.019) (0.435) (0.093) (0.323)
SIG 71.6274 31.3219 23.5586 91.2445 -114.0704 -101.4777
(0.010) (0.109) (0.235) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009)
SDUM -0.2069 0.0337 -0.0353 -0.0047 0.1252 -0.3015
(0.138) (0.832) (0.856) (0.968) (0.366) (0.298)
LTDUM -0.2201 -0.0554 -0.0934 -0.2895 -0.2127 -0.2751
(0.270) (0.684) (0.563) (0.013) (0.018) (0.122)
HTDUM 0.1098 0.0503 0.0053 0.0145 0.0404 0.0162
(0.177) (0.417) (0.943) (0.775) (0.389) (0.822)
LN(INS) 0.1803 0.0786 0.0825 0.2927 0.1209 0.1007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INSDUM -1.8792 -0.4136 -0.5149 -4.2925 -1.6488 -2.2307
(0.000) (0.039) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CashSF -1.0133 -0.7311 -0.7051 -0.8009 -0.7178 -0.7839
(0.000) (0.001) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
IntBD 0.0040 -0.0002 0.0081 -0.0046 -0.0009 0.0025
(0.581) (0.971) (0.434) (0.077) (0.626) (0.408)
N 83 83 83 409 409 409
Adj R sq 0.4289 0.8077 0.7356 0.4013 0.7434 0.6302
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
For Period 1992 to 2001 For Period 1997 to 2001
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of executive stock option grants, CEX , on the
explanatory variables indicated below for the period 1992 to 2001 and 1997 to 2001 using the pooled and
panel data. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Fixed effects at the firm or
industry level are included where indicated, but not reported. For the period 1992 to 2001 and the period 1997
to 2001, a total of 58 and 144 SIC3 industry constants are recorded respectively. The estimated coefficients for
the explanatory variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses are reported.
Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1.
Table 8: Analyses of the Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants (CEX ) Using
Pooled and Panel Data
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
LN(CEX) -0.9773 -0.6689 -1.0142 -0.7455 -0.4186 -0.2447 -3.7803 -5.7807 -4.6404 -1.6913
(0.104) (0.176) (0.017) (0.053) (0.247) (0.718) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
[LN(CEX)]^2 0.0410 0.0304 0.0443 0.0351 0.0241 0.0228 0.1417 0.2080 0.1781 0.0715
(0.062) (0.090) (0.004) (0.011) (0.054) (0.326) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LN(S) -1.3382 -2.2709 -1.0387 -1.7399 -2.5663 -3.4483 -5.1721 -11.6508 -2.2711 -0.8170
(0.005) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.095)
[LN(S)]^2 0.0292 0.0492 0.0209 0.0359 0.0526 0.0736 0.1163 0.2651 0.0432 0.0129
(0.011) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.259)
K/S -0.3212 -0.1463 -0.1946 -0.0766 -0.1524 -0.2024 0.0087 0.5450 -0.3472 -0.2629
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.237) (0.075) (0.114) (0.964) (0.006) (0.000) (0.012)
(K/S)^2 0.0441 0.0014 0.0240 0.0096 0.0012 0.0306 -0.0210 -0.0522 0.0111 0.0135
(0.002) (0.010) (0.043) (0.349) (0.939) (0.232) (0.487) (0.055) (0.224) (0.599)
EBIT/S 0.0115 -0.0101 0.0047 -0.0037 -0.0449 0.0991 0.0391 -0.0335 0.0160 -0.0105
(0.303) (0.477) (0.709) (0.728) (0.000) (0.000) (0.166) (0.264) (0.334) (0.459)
I/K 0.6754 1.5110 0.6446 1.1909 2.3471 0.4580 6.4318 13.0012 -0.2519 1.1085
(0.168) (0.000) (0.051) (0.001) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.487) (0.011)
RD/K 0.6793 0.0926 0.6847 1.3113 0.3049 0.0650 -0.6536 1.1352 0.4013 0.2049
(0.000) (0.544) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.664) (0.000) (0.003) (0.012) (0.042)
RDUM 0.1282 0.1627 0.1333 0.1598 0.2899 0.2707 0.7702 0.9517 0.2834 0.3524
(0.188) (0.030) (0.044) (0.024) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000)
A/K -0.1153 -0.0968 0.0020 -0.2355 -0.5675 -0.0269 3.4172 -1.2444 -0.4599 -0.1381
(0.739) (0.692) (0.991) (0.432) (0.027) (0.915) (0.000) (0.033) (0.152) (0.495)
ADUM 0.2537 0.3058 0.0455 0.0077 0.2044 0.2253 -0.2204 0.5588 -0.0618 0.2481
(0.012) (0.000) (0.595) (0.939) (0.057) (0.086) (0.353) (0.047) (0.646) (0.002)
SIG -34.8980 22.6974 -106.4112 -57.6341 -85.2704 -26.3226 276.4269 67.1021 25.7535 -98.7437
(0.157) (0.757) (0.189) (0.288) (0.221) (0.694) (0.000) (0.557) (0.570) (0.002)
SDUM 0.1480 0.2052 0.2145 0.0931 0.2042 0.2983 0.2514 0.7334 0.2037 0.3649
(0.127) (0.019) (0.007) (0.261) (0.062) (0.045) (0.373) (0.086) (0.467) (0.137)
LTDUM -0.3467 -0.3682 -0.0206 -0.0896 -0.3319 0.0057 0.1471 -0.1769 -0.2033 -0.0289
(0.154) (0.067) (0.922) (0.663) (0.148) (0.983) (0.727) (0.765) (0.458) (0.838)
HTDUM 0.1025 0.0674 -0.0002 0.0051 -0.0618 -0.0343 0.1053 -0.3317 0.0386 0.1714
(0.286) (0.366) (0.998) (0.943) (0.470) (0.757) (0.588) (0.171) (0.750) (0.016)
LN(INS) -0.0174 0.1720 0.0123 0.0035 0.1006 0.0927 0.1331 0.2945 0.0639 0.0593
(0.899) (0.192) (0.745) (0.869) (0.000) (0.002) (0.018) (0.000) (0.051) (0.003)
INSDUM 0.0813 -1.5399 -0.0156 0.0364 -1.4937 -1.4192 -2.4489 -4.2016 -0.9060 -1.0058
(0.945) (0.251) (0.966) (0.887) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000) (0.097) (0.004)
CashSF -2.2889 -0.9740 -0.3529 -0.7855 -0.8835 -0.2814 -1.6474 -0.8051 -1.9236 -2.1870
(0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.301) (0.003) (0.154) (0.000) (0.000)
IntBD -0.0016 -0.0039 -0.0157 -0.0004 -0.0087 -0.0429 -0.0340 -0.0302 -0.0134 -0.0049
(0.867) (0.571) (0.144) (0.935) (0.363) (0.001) (0.090) (0.182) (0.340) (0.337)
N 505 753 852 925 1131 1187 1257 1282 1220 1009
Adj R sq 0.3619 0.3926 0.2715 0.4061 0.3957 0.2919 0.2288 0.4013 0.3912 0.4247
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 9: Analyses of the Relationship Between Executive Stock Option Grants (CEX
and Firm Performance (Q ) Using Cross-Sectional Data
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional data. Intercept terms
are included for all regressions, but not reported. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the
explanatory variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable
definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1.
Variables Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects
LN(CEX) -3.7976 -4.1696 -3.3575 -3.7526 -5.1351 -2.3010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[LN(CEX)]^2 0.1439 0.1635 0.1310 0.1448 0.1978 0.0923
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LN(S) 0.7962 4.0424 0.7096 -2.6723 0.3139 -0.7373
(0.103) (0.000) (0.532) (0.000) (0.721) (0.502)
[LN(S)]^2 -0.0241 -0.1100 -0.0294 0.0530 -0.0213 0.0009
(0.034) (0.000) (0.283) (0.000) (0.325) (0.972)
K/S -0.0876 -0.5267 -0.2667 -0.1990 -0.8208 -0.9675
(0.416) (0.028) (0.344) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
(K/S)^2 0.0078 0.0646 0.0212 0.0178 0.0735 0.0862
(0.739) (0.060) (0.548) (0.233) (0.003) (0.000)
EBIT/S -0.0016 0.0024 -0.0198 0.0004 0.0010 -0.0037
(0.780) (0.586) (0.295) (0.957) (0.858) (0.668)
I/K 1.5436 -0.1719 0.8529 2.2693 1.1726 0.0186
(0.005) (0.720) (0.123) (0.000) (0.002) (0.961)
RD/K 1.1438 -0.1190 -0.3232 0.1193 -0.0398 -0.6025
(0.000) (0.694) (0.607) (0.063) (0.431) (0.032)
RDUM 0.4138 0.2062 0.4439 0.5363 0.4475 -0.0077
(0.000) (0.414) (0.107) (0.000) (0.054) (0.964)
A/K -1.1708 0.3270 -1.4665 -0.6477 0.7609 0.4738
(0.010) (0.773) (0.196) (0.000) (0.044) (0.050)
ADUM 0.1994 -0.1364 0.1242 0.1853 0.0180 -0.0508
(0.055) (0.293) (0.310) (0.019) (0.902) (0.708)
SIG -20.7795 -10.2727 -5.8008 -62.8572 -183.2926 -42.2415
(0.493) (0.647) (0.740) (0.087) (0.000) (0.126)
SDUM 0.2677 0.1966 0.1794 0.1665 -0.2593 0.2613
(0.077) (0.278) (0.295) (0.283) (0.150) (0.206)
LTDUM 0.0937 -0.1322 -0.2052 -0.0411 -0.1182 0.0186
(0.665) (0.396) (0.151) (0.791) (0.311) (0.883)
HTDUM -0.0265 0.0701 -0.0742 -0.0196 0.0198 -0.0270
(0.764) (0.323) (0.256) (0.772) (0.746) (0.603)
LN(INS) 0.0574 0.0074 0.0146 0.1111 0.0487 0.0344
(0.007) (0.641) (0.306) (0.000) (0.003) (0.012)
INSDUM -0.8556 -0.2120 -0.1984 -1.5504 -0.9860 -0.8474
(0.007) (0.363) (0.344) (0.000) (0.016) (0.009)
CashSF -1.0580 0.0136 -0.1271 -1.9029 -0.2626 -0.5114
(0.000) (0.956) (0.640) (0.000) (0.153) (0.005)
IntBD 0.0124 0.0134 0.0293 -0.0016 -0.0004 -0.0006
(0.117) (0.022) (0.001) (0.630) (0.872) (0.799)
N 83 83 83 409 409 409
Adj R sq 0.4525 0.7534 0.6656 0.493 0.8067 0.7422
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
For Period 1992 to 2001 For Period 1997 to 2001
Table 10: Analyses of the Relationship Between Executive Stock Option Grants
(CEX ) and Firm Performance (Q ) Using Pooled and Panel Data 
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for the period 1992 to 2001 and 1997 to 2001 using the pooled and panel data.
Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Fixed effects at the firm or industry level are
included where indicated, but not reported. For the period 1992 to 2001 and the period 1997 to 2001, a total
of 58 and 144 SIC3 industry constants are recorded respectively. The estimated coefficients for the
explanatory variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses are reported.
Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1.
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
^LN(CEX) 25.2895 48.3175 -12.6872 -4.5457 -68.8135 -70.3272 -92.7149 -156.0079 -27.5277 -9.2290
(0.507) (0.164) (0.219) (0.349) (0.259) (0.014) (0.020) (0.406) (0.037) (0.237)
^[LN(CEX)]^2 -0.9130 -1.7562 0.4458 0.1488 2.3222 2.3618 3.0924 5.2029 0.8963 0.2947
(0.504) (0.161) (0.231) (0.385) (0.263) (0.015) (0.020) (0.406) (0.040) (0.256)
K/S 0.0404 0.0283 -0.2745 -0.1433 -0.9817 -1.3460 -0.9205 -0.3411 -0.1273 -0.3156
(0.953) (0.858) (0.020) (0.097) (0.232) (0.017) (0.147) (0.815) (0.515) (0.034)
(K/S)^2 0.0064 0.0002 0.0294 0.0263 0.0953 0.2681 -0.0153 0.0326 0.0055 0.0398
(0.942) (0.923) (0.131) (0.045) (0.381) (0.017) (0.849) (0.803) (0.763) (0.277)
EBIT/S 0.0204 0.0300 0.0287 0.0363 0.0610 0.1937 0.0998 -0.0736 0.0753 -0.0144
(0.569) (0.560) (0.179) (0.032) (0.509) (0.000) (0.171) (0.711) (0.036) (0.466)
I/K 1.4120 1.2856 2.2153 3.5000 3.6812 3.3747 12.3459 18.9585 2.1313 2.8628
(0.231) (0.602) (0.000) (0.000) (0.124) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
RD/K 1.2157 1.2024 1.4062 2.2853 1.2709 0.6348 -0.2457 1.7170 0.9687 0.5517
(0.005) (0.073) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.176) (0.528) (0.367) (0.004) (0.000)
RDUM -0.2358 -0.2292 0.3800 0.2581 1.2281 1.4594 1.5391 3.1047 0.7287 0.5339
(0.696) (0.621) (0.028) (0.019) (0.164) (0.010) (0.005) (0.199) (0.007) (0.000)
A/K 0.1248 1.4624 -0.2135 -0.2893 -1.9154 -1.2892 2.9156 -0.0832 0.1302 -0.4010
(0.892) (0.336) (0.556) (0.466) (0.345) (0.207) (0.074) (0.980) (0.845) (0.162)
ADUM 0.3019 0.5018 0.1015 -0.0539 -0.9195 0.6661 -1.2449 0.4986 -0.2217 0.3505
(0.352) (0.120) (0.478) (0.682) (0.436) (0.162) (0.132) (0.666) (0.392) (0.003)
LTDUM -0.4320 -0.5102 0.2993 0.1735 -1.2927 -0.2955 0.2978 -1.9750 -0.0595 -0.0008
(0.522) (0.519) (0.482) (0.549) (0.398) (0.741) (0.794) (0.559) (0.912) (0.997)
HTDUM -0.0420 0.5213 -0.0187 0.0344 -1.1371 -1.0331 -0.2042 -2.3558 -0.2198 0.1888
(0.896) (0.253) (0.878) (0.732) (0.213) (0.045) (0.698) (0.346) (0.331) (0.064)
LN(INS) -0.3941 0.8527 0.0479 0.0530 0.3993 0.3805 0.7666 0.5823 0.5623 0.3096
(0.599) (0.257) (0.466) (0.081) (0.078) (0.009) (0.015) (0.299) (0.000) (0.000)
INSDUM 3.4141 -8.6573 -0.3779 -0.4258 -5.7066 -5.5405 -11.9012 -7.1202 -7.4142 -4.8888
(0.599) (0.263) (0.544) (0.226) (0.083) (0.012) (0.013) (0.370) (0.000) (0.000)
CashSF -1.1216 -0.5769 -1.0224 -1.0571 -4.8814 -4.0441 -5.0293 -2.2210 -3.8290 -2.8140
(0.655) (0.567) (0.002) (0.000) (0.103) (0.012) (0.014) (0.458) (0.000) (0.000)
IntBD 0.0025 -0.0268 -0.0303 -0.0182 -0.1192 -0.0848 -0.1701 0.0293 -0.0763 -0.0122
(0.929) (0.397) (0.085) (0.113) (0.225) (0.060) (0.027) (0.799) (0.032) (0.096)
N 505 753 852 925 1131 1187 1257 1282 1220 1009
Adj R sq -2.1620 -7.8744 -0.9677 -0.0403 -20.9255 -7.2939 -4.5702 -8.5669 -1.0600 -0.1246
Table 11: Panel A - Analyses of the Relationship Between Executive Stock Option
Grants (CEX ) and Firm Performance (Q ) Using Cross-Sectional Data With
Instrumental Variables
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional data with
instrumental variables. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Instrumental variables
are LN(S), [LN(S)]2, SIG and SDUM. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables 
and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable definitions for the acronyms
are presented in Table 1, except for ^LN(CEX) and ^[LN(CEX)]^2, which represent the estimated LN(CEX)
and [LN(CEX)]^2 variables.
Variables Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects
^LN(CEX) -1.3173 0.0269 -0.1005 0.9219 0.1151 -0.9272
(0.446) (0.781) (0.309) (0.709) (0.433) (0.000)
^[LN(CEX)]^2 0.0377 0.0752 -0.1322 -0.0399 -0.7218 -2.0033
(0.502) (0.376) (0.205) (0.621) (0.002) (0.052)
K/S -0.1236 -0.7642 0.0747 -0.1620 -0.7279 -0.8737
(0.292) (0.005) (0.818) (0.067) (0.003) (0.000)
(K/S)^2 0.0105 0.0993 -0.0198 0.0098 0.0811 0.0847
(0.682) (0.013) (0.629) (0.567) (0.008) (0.005)
EBIT/S -0.0035 0.0004 -0.0155 0.0160 -0.0001 -0.0059
(0.589) (0.932) (0.478) (0.057) (0.992) (0.575)
I/K 2.8104 -0.5829 1.0627 5.4011 1.6076 -0.0038
(0.000) (0.304) (0.096) (0.000) (0.000) (0.993)
RD/K 1.8702 -0.7763 0.2874 0.4179 -0.0152 -0.5557
(0.000) (0.027) (0.694) (0.000) (0.803) (0.097)
RDUM 0.3728 0.0899 0.2332 0.8201 0.5391 -0.1051
(0.000) (0.763) (0.461) (0.000) (0.054) (0.612)
A/K -1.6855 2.2818 0.3611 -0.8920 -0.1843 -0.0375
(0.000) (0.090) (0.783) (0.000) (0.693) (0.897)
ADUM 0.2911 -0.4072 -0.0895 0.2734 0.0048 -0.2782
(0.010) (0.008) (0.525) (0.003) (0.979) (0.093)
LTDUM -0.0179 -0.1170 -0.2115 -0.1324 -0.0975 0.0502
(0.940) (0.529) (0.206) (0.455) (0.487) (0.744)
HTDUM 0.0572 0.1116 -0.0638 0.0237 0.1388 0.0348
(0.556) (0.187) (0.404) (0.759) (0.060) (0.580)
LN(INS) 0.1537 0.0652 0.0591 0.2356 0.1330 0.0624
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INSDUM -1.9601 -0.7352 -0.6381 -3.2648 -1.8603 -1.1708
(0.000) (0.008) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
CashSF -1.5239 -0.7063 -0.5071 -2.3376 -1.1159 -0.9059
(0.000) (0.014) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IntBD 0.0144 0.0175 0.0353 -0.0073 -0.0009 -0.0007
(0.098) (0.013) (0.001) (0.060) (0.766) (0.792)
N 83 83 83 409 409 409
Adj R sq 0.3326 0.6981 0.6113 0.3345 0.7276 0.6443
For Period 1992 to 2001 For Period 1997 to 2001
Table 11: Panel B - Analyses of the Relationship Between Executive Stock Option
Grants (CEX) and Firm Performance (Q) Using Pooled and Panel Data With
Instrumental Variables
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for the period 1992 to 2001 and 1997 to 2001 using the pooled and panel data with
instrumental variables. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Instrumental variables
are LN(S), [LN(S)]2, SIG and SDUM. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables
and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable definitions for the acronyms
are presented in Table 1, except for ^LN(CEX) and ^[LN(CEX)]^2, which represent estimated LN(CEX) and
[LN(CEX)]^2 variables.
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
LN(S) 0.7628 0.8278 1.0785 0.4885 0.1843 -0.9663 -1.3294 -0.4023 0.0000 0.7260
(0.625) (0.512) (0.370) (0.629) (0.837) (0.205) (0.138) (0.572) (1.000) (0.439)
(LN(S))^2 -0.0041 -0.0131 -0.0203 -0.0018 0.0059 0.0325 0.0422 0.0161 0.0081 -0.0086
(0.672) (0.667) (0.483) (0.941) (0.784) (0.08132) (0.053) (0.348) (0.631) (0.701)
K/S 0.3915 0.4960 0.2647 0.1976 -0.2198 -0.4274 -0.4780 0.1747 0.0539 0.1994
(0.248) (0.408) (0.617) (0.691) (0.399) (0.06924) (0.039) (0.287) (0.701) (0.586)
(K/S)^2 -0.3276 -0.2589 -0.1724 -0.1276 0.0487 0.0883 0.1086 -0.0041 -0.0001 -0.0390
(0.342) (0.187) (0.301) (0.479) (0.369) (0.055) (0.019) (0.823) (0.992) (0.793)
EBIT/S 0.0845 0.0803 0.0207 0.0058 0.0043 -0.0025 0.0246 -0.0170 -0.0278 -0.0153
(0.130) (0.185) (0.421) (0.765) (0.836) (0.873) (0.069) (0.104) (0.112) (0.421)
I/K 1.6951 1.5955 2.6984 1.6283 2.8185 1.2782 1.4265 1.2710 2.4146 1.8151
(0.071) (0.064) (0.006) (0.043) (0.000) (0.043) (0.020) (0.015) (0.000) (0.003)
RD/K 0.3434 0.3333 1.4370 0.8119 0.6445 0.1503 0.2396 0.6217 0.3293 0.4634
(0.147) (0.172) (0.000) (0.010) (0.002) (0.333) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.009)
RDUM -0.2915 -0.3106 -0.2512 -0.1902 -0.0436 -0.2436 -0.6045 -0.3543 -0.0206 -0.0730
(0.377) (0.276) (0.330) (0.414) (0.843) (0.227) (0.008) (0.092) (0.915) (0.737)
A/K 1.8995 3.9586 -0.7446 -3.0653 -1.0452 0.3175 -1.2613 -1.0039 -0.6193 0.1499
(0.025) (0.015) (0.717) (0.310) (0.128) (0.613) (0.006) (0.037) (0.062) (0.729)
ADUM -0.1096 -0.0913 0.0272 -0.2382 0.0591 -0.2049 0.2543 0.1808 -0.0756 -0.1524
(0.563) (0.669) (0.919) (0.480) (0.774) (0.281) (0.157) (0.265) (0.570) (0.274)
SIG -40.0020 -30.5514 -45.7663 25.1639 -51.3580 88.4673 -9.7550 170.9990 25.4001 11.4330
(0.801) (0.871) (0.017) (0.878) (0.644) (0.224) (0.802) (0.010) (0.501) (0.786)
SDUM 0.0320 0.0263 0.6055 -0.2388 0.0183 -0.0016 0.2801 0.0183 0.0411 0.1748
(0.999) (0.921) (0.012) (0.305) (0.940) (0.994) (0.203) (0.944) (0.896) (0.739)
LTDUM 0.3926 0.2446 -0.1287 -0.1521 -0.7257 -0.2398 -0.2705 -0.5121 -0.1080 0.0056
(0.982) (0.534) (0.868) (0.714) (0.082) (0.464) (0.404) (0.046) (0.720) (0.979)
HTDUM 0.6168 0.4163 -0.0913 0.0770 -0.0604 0.0549 -0.1695 0.0125 -0.0501 0.0028
(0.082) (0.068) (0.644) (0.661) (0.722) (0.714) (0.244) (0.927) (0.682) (0.982)
LN(INS) -0.5340 -0.4929 0.1813 0.0030 0.1309 0.0426 0.2448 0.3288 0.2424 0.2361
(0.219) (0.220) (0.138) (0.954) (0.002) (0.384) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INSDUM 2.0067 4.9672 -1.5543 0.2071 -1.7850 -0.6093 -3.7081 -5.3927 -3.8105 -3.5968
(0.883) (0.226) (0.184) (0.728) (0.008) (0.429) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CashSF -0.7917 -0.7738 -1.0737 -0.4846 -0.8039 -0.8843 -1.2147 -0.7914 -0.8228 -0.6928
(0.213) (0.254) (0.098) (0.322) (0.076) (0.008) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.051)
IntBD -0.0100 -0.0022 -0.0211 -0.0036 -0.0251 -0.0046 -0.0102 -0.0016 -0.0143 -0.0162
(0.929) (0.894) (0.480) (0.748) (0.033) (0.770) (0.291) (0.883) (0.170) (0.011)
N 84 138 156 179 239 168 303 318 301 253
Adj R sq 0.2938 0.1958 0.2060 0.2392 0.3906 0.2335 0.3964 0.4564 0.5271 0.4533
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appendix 3: Analyses of the Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants (CEX
Using Cross-Sectional Data of Technology Firms
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of executive stock option grants, CEX , on the
explanatory variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional data for
technology firms. The definition of technology firms is presented in Appendix 2. Intercept terms are included
for all regressions, but not reported. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables
and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable definitions for the acronyms are
presented in Table 1.
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
LN(S) -1.3971 -1.7533 -0.5243 -0.4401 -1.3643 -1.6513 -2.3695 -1.6571 -1.3612 -0.8282
(0.042) (0.006) (0.398) (0.476) (0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.035) (0.150)
(LN(S))^2 0.0395 0.0474 0.0188 0.0185 0.0410 0.0471 0.0628 0.0466 0.0394 0.0259
(0.017) (0.002) (0.204) (0.208) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.051)
K/S -0.2823 -0.0985 -0.1200 -0.0664 -0.2237 -0.4641 -0.2314 -0.0886 0.0177 -0.1683
(0.014) (0.031) (0.223) (0.462) (0.018) (0.000) (0.003) (0.208) (0.794) (0.124)
(K/S)^2 0.0348 0.0011 0.0103 0.0050 0.0256 0.0665 0.0115 0.0127 0.0006 0.0392
(0.052) (0.121) (0.551) (0.722) (0.126) (0.000) (0.333) (0.207) (0.949) (0.126)
EBIT/S 0.0282 -0.0243 0.0051 0.0362 0.0095 0.0389 0.0048 0.0051 0.0069 -0.0134
(0.056) (0.222) (0.824) (0.039) (0.456) (0.015) (0.792) (0.754) (0.553) (0.463)
I/K 2.5152 2.3746 2.4699 4.0398 2.4435 0.7220 2.2452 2.0636 0.3835 2.4576
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.118) (0.000)
RD/K 0.2340 0.1504 1.1782 1.8041 0.3567 0.4157 0.0755 0.7777 0.4995 0.3692
(0.499) (0.678) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.004) (0.356) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
RDUM -0.0665 0.0669 0.1520 -0.0498 0.0527 0.0198 -0.0284 0.0866 -0.0640 0.1099
(0.620) (0.544) (0.141) (0.636) (0.578) (0.817) (0.734) (0.342) (0.458) (0.173)
A/K 0.0180 -0.3409 -0.0294 0.1835 0.3738 0.0511 0.0176 -0.1126 0.4380 -0.3351
(0.968) (0.290) (0.915) (0.648) (0.189) (0.778) (0.953) (0.575) (0.057) (0.120)
ADUM 0.4334 0.2573 0.0895 -0.0467 -0.0959 0.0114 -0.0111 -0.0223 -0.1187 0.1428
(0.002) (0.023) (0.519) (0.746) (0.446) (0.912) (0.916) (0.830) (0.221) (0.103)
SIG 82.5780 272.9420 -81.0860 202.8790 88.7540 4.1460 -26.3540 125.0180 121.7480 -30.8412
(0.008) (0.011) (0.558) (0.010) (0.351) (0.946) (0.347) (0.002) (0.002) (0.559)
SDUM 0.0456 -0.1672 -0.0179 0.1671 0.0316 -0.0557 0.1360 -0.0499 0.1890 0.1899
(0.728) (0.171) (0.885) (0.162) (0.802) (0.631) (0.262) (0.745) (0.334) (0.459)
LTDUM 0.4882 0.3457 0.0915 0.4530 -0.1374 -0.0613 -0.1132 0.1655 -0.0905 0.0635
(0.162) (0.297) (0.773) (0.160) (0.614) (0.770) (0.533) (0.502) (0.632) (0.697)
HTDUM 0.2018 -0.1254 0.0657 0.1013 -0.3352 -0.1213 -0.0769 -0.0803 -0.1885 0.0063
(0.121) (0.229) (0.554) (0.331) (0.001) (0.167) (0.362) (0.361) (0.027) (0.936)
LN(INS) 0.3140 -0.0085 0.0131 0.1042 0.1485 0.1718 0.2387 0.3037 0.3436 0.2547
(0.063) (0.963) (0.820) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INSDUM -2.5700 0.1876 -0.4519 -1.0736 -2.1872 -2.5831 -3.5203 -4.3919 -4.9356 -4.0263
(0.075) (0.920) (0.425) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CashSF -1.0736 -1.0400 -1.1574 -0.3877 -1.7606 -1.4142 -0.9417 -1.1574 -1.4552 -0.7952
(0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
IntBD -0.0361 0.0019 -0.0124 -0.0169 -0.0192 -0.0333 -0.0450 -0.0001 -0.0298 0.0015
(0.015) (0.862) (0.469) (0.044) (0.252) (0.002) (0.000) (0.993) (0.014) (0.830)
N 421 615 696 746 892 1019 954 964 919 756
Adj R sq 0.2071 0.1493 0.1362 0.2095 0.2499 0.2752 0.3163 0.3515 0.4454 0.4023
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.859 0.000
Appendix 4: Analyses of the Determinants of Executive Stock Option Grants (CEX
Using Cross-Sectional Data of Non-Technology Firms
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of executive stock option grants, CEX , on the
explanatory variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional data of
non-technology firms. The definition of technology firms is presented in Appendix 2. Intercept terms are
included for all regressions, but not reported. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the explanatory
variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable definitions for the
acronyms are presented in Table 1.
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
LN(S) -0.3798 -0.5678 -0.0507 -0.2349 -0.0705 -0.8389 -0.1337 0.0105 -0.4408 -0.0855
(0.529) (0.276) (0.920) (0.619) (0.872) (0.035) (0.726) (0.979) (0.273) (0.842)
[LN(S)]^2 0.0142 0.0193 0.0081 0.0133 0.0101 0.0273 0.0103 0.0085 0.0194 0.0114
(0.329) (0.124) (0.503) (0.239) (0.333) (0.004) (0.258) (0.371) (0.040) (0.254)
K/S -0.1870 -0.0156 -0.0396 -0.1021 -0.0819 -0.3446 -0.1151 0.0042 0.1040 0.2079
(0.092) (0.714) (0.645) (0.185) (0.310) (0.000) (0.085) (0.937) (0.034) (0.025)
(K/S)^2 0.0341 0.0003 0.0101 0.0142 0.0194 0.0622 0.0204 0.0085 0.0008 -0.0319
(0.054) (0.631) (0.514) (0.244) (0.172) (0.000) (0.054) (0.245) (0.875) (0.158)
EBIT/S 0.0122 -0.0202 0.0226 0.0261 0.0202 0.0197 0.0000 -0.0077 -0.0122 0.0089
(0.392) (0.258) (0.170) (0.037) (0.031) (0.081) (0.997) (0.341) (0.170) (0.477)
I/K 2.1159 2.4123 1.8498 3.2459 2.4726 0.6791 1.9489 1.2730 1.0397 1.8044
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RD/K 0.5055 0.3856 1.0705 0.8856 0.3734 0.4073 0.1002 0.5876 0.4187 0.4289
(0.035) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RDUM 0.0056 0.0804 0.0637 0.0451 0.0642 0.1191 0.1840 0.1296 0.2132 0.2437
(0.964) (0.390) (0.461) (0.592) (0.400) (0.112) (0.006) (0.057) (0.001) (0.000)
A/K 0.2080 -0.4452 0.2582 0.2539 0.1918 -0.0529 -0.1628 -0.0947 0.1173 -0.1483
(0.638) (0.145) (0.301) (0.476) (0.429) (0.760) (0.441) (0.545) (0.496) (0.404)
ADUM 0.3218 0.2833 0.1382 0.0927 0.1939 0.1634 0.1536 0.0570 0.1094 0.1010
(0.012) (0.004) (0.217) (0.433) (0.056) (0.071) (0.064) (0.451) (0.129) (0.148)
SIG 24.5929 226.5113 106.0112 15.8491 197.3827 190.6334 41.2187 206.1934 183.2152 194.1653
(0.431) (0.013) (0.317) (0.805) (0.003) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SDUM -0.1292 -0.2941 -0.2068 -0.2043 -0.1355 -0.3093 -0.0964 -0.3423 -0.4041 -0.3763
(0.297) (0.007) (0.046) (0.038) (0.190) (0.003) (0.329) (0.003) (0.007) (0.081)
LTDUM 0.5109 0.2317 -0.2837 0.1965 -0.0348 -0.1786 0.1011 0.1823 -0.0661 0.0158
(0.099) (0.359) (0.303) (0.421) (0.872) (0.319) (0.494) (0.253) (0.653) (0.899)
HTDUM 0.1339 -0.0908 -0.0782 -0.0472 -0.2027 -0.1399 -0.0652 -0.0943 -0.1296 -0.1525
(0.275) (0.331) (0.394) (0.574) (0.012) (0.067) (0.339) (0.148) (0.046) (0.015)
LN(INS) 0.2384 -0.0878 0.0116 0.0552 0.0788 0.1070 0.1405 0.1958 0.2163 0.1699
(0.170) (0.595) (0.814) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INSDUM -2.2757 1.0876 -0.3177 -0.6600 -1.2792 -1.7418 -2.2046 -2.9350 -3.2953 -2.7225
(0.126) (0.518) (0.510) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CashSF -0.4271 -0.0387 -0.4397 0.0466 -0.6275 -0.7373 -0.4145 -0.2733 -0.2742 -0.0454
(0.309) (0.878) (0.044) (0.824) (0.004) (0.000) (0.028) (0.069) (0.087) (0.816)
IntBD -0.0358 -0.0092 -0.0136 0.0012 -0.0120 -0.0277 -0.0115 0.0012 -0.0142 -0.0066
(0.003) (0.288) (0.333) (0.845) (0.183) (0.002) (0.101) (0.840) (0.060) (0.139)
N 505 753 852 925 1131 1187 1257 1282 1220 1009
Adj R sq 0.1392 0.1273 0.1432 0.1845 0.2177 0.2022 0.2263 0.3256 0.4459 0.4176
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appendix 6: Analyses of the Determinants of Single Year Executive Stock Option 
Grants (EX ) using Cross-Sectional Data
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of single year executive stock option grants, EX
on the explanatory variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional
data. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. This table reports the estimated
coefficients for the explanatory variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses.
Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1.
Variables Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects
LN(S) 0.7755 0.1267 -0.1134 -0.3115 0.7059 -0.1549
(0.398) (0.645) (1.281) (0.295) (0.642) (1.575)
[LN(S)]^2 -0.0085 0.0149 0.0205 0.0155 0.0054 0.0242
(0.009) (0.016) (0.031) (0.007) (0.016) (0.037)
K/S -0.0795 0.1356 0.3230 -0.0452 0.1950 0.4931
(0.088) (0.204) (0.316) (0.054) (0.151) (0.288)
(K/S)^2 0.0340 0.0028 -0.0171 0.0104 0.0027 -0.0205
(0.019) (0.029) (0.040) (0.010) (0.018) (0.035)
EBIT/S 0.0028 0.0067 0.0330 -0.0075 -0.0004 -0.0084
(0.005) (0.004) (0.022) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)
I/K 2.1226 0.7499 0.8104 1.5957 0.4516 0.3047
(0.442) (0.410) (0.628) (0.281) (0.279) (0.548)
RD/K 1.5701 -0.0509 -0.1028 0.1507 0.0221 0.0876
(0.177) (0.259) (0.712) (0.045) (0.037) (0.402)
RDUM 0.0574 -0.5348 -0.4580 0.2621 -0.0391 -0.1943
(0.074) (0.215) (0.310) (0.047) (0.170) (0.245)
A/K -0.7482 1.0283 1.9575 0.1500 -0.4576 -0.1673
(0.375) (0.971) (1.277) (0.106) (0.277) (0.347)
ADUM 0.2859 -0.1845 -0.1075 0.0393 -0.0692 -0.5060
(0.085) (0.111) (0.138) (0.055) (0.108) (0.194)
SIG 50.1862 18.4086 6.6102 275.7552 19.9399 -9.7814
(24.838) (19.246) (19.864) (25.709) (24.498) (39.398)
SDUM -0.1611 0.2339 0.0742 -0.1536 0.2352 0.1059
(0.125) (0.156) (0.195) (0.109) (0.132) (0.296)
LTDUM 0.0079 0.0957 0.0752 -0.0480 -0.1081 -0.2047
(0.178) (0.134) (0.162) (0.109) (0.085) (0.182)
HTDUM 0.1087 0.0833 0.0494 0.0105 0.1155 0.1421
(0.073) (0.061) (0.074) (0.047) (0.045) (0.074)
LN(INS) 0.1389 0.0510 0.0540 0.1633 0.0225 0.0197
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019)
INSDUM -1.4290 -0.2425 -0.2292 -2.4471 -0.3560 -0.8309
(0.252) (0.198) (0.236) (0.225) (0.297) (0.454)
CashSF -0.3525 -0.3829 -0.2020 -0.0644 -0.0042 -0.2026
(0.227) (0.209) (0.307) (0.148) (0.133) (0.258)
IntBD 0.0083 0.0089 0.0132 -0.0048 -0.0013 0.0025
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
N 83 83 83 409 409 409
Adj R sq 0.4436 0.8020 0.6923 0.3344 0.7441 0.6406
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appendix 7: Analyses of the Determinants of Single Year Executive Stock Option 
Grants (EX ) using Pooled and Panel Data
For Period 1992 to 2001 For Period 1997 to 2001
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of single year executive stock option grants, EX
on the explanatory variables indicated below for the period 1992 to 2001 and 1997 to 2001 using the pooled
and panel data. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Fixed effects at the firm or
industry level are included where indicated, but not reported. For the period 1992 to 2001 and the period 1997
to 2001, a total of 58 and 144 SIC3 industry constants are recorded respectively. The estimated coefficients for
the explanatory variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses are reported.
Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1.
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
LN(EX) 0.3017 -0.1834 -0.5807 0.3504 -0.5417 -0.5007 -0.0424 -1.2547 -1.1347 -1.1979
(0.462) (0.656) (0.161) (0.337) (0.104) (0.355) (0.965) (0.326) (0.084) (0.013)
[LN(EX)]^2 -0.0103 0.0106 0.0255 -0.0114 0.0260 0.0265 0.0051 0.0503 0.0506 0.0541
(0.539) (0.519) (0.116) (0.428) (0.043) (0.201) (0.889) (0.284) (0.034) (0.002)
LN(S) -1.4872 -2.4318 -1.1509 -1.9777 -2.8553 -3.9937 -6.2796 -12.3166 -3.0840 -1.0080
(0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050)
[LN(S)]^2 0.0335 0.0536 0.0244 0.0431 0.0608 0.0885 0.1452 0.2830 0.0656 0.0177
(0.004) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.140)
K/S -0.3465 -0.1600 -0.2194 -0.0795 -0.2014 -0.3233 -0.0474 0.5705 -0.3992 -0.3831
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.242) (0.022) (0.014) (0.807) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001)
(K/S)^2 0.0471 0.0015 0.0262 0.0083 0.0065 0.0469 -0.0163 -0.0529 0.0164 0.0351
(0.001) (0.004) (0.033) (0.442) (0.677) (0.076) (0.595) (0.056) (0.098) (0.195)
EBIT/S 0.0147 -0.0102 0.0042 -0.0015 -0.0452 0.1022 0.0417 -0.0334 0.0054 -0.0163
(0.197) (0.483) (0.750) (0.890) (0.000) (0.000) (0.145) (0.274) (0.764) (0.276)
I/K 0.8461 1.6882 1.0477 1.9119 2.7188 0.6680 7.1042 13.7852 -0.1770 1.5621
(0.090) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.655) (0.001)
RD/K 0.7428 0.1243 0.8847 1.5591 0.3657 0.1203 -0.5842 1.4487 0.6763 0.2594
(0.000) (0.424) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.437) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015)
RDUM 0.1096 0.1647 0.1574 0.1620 0.3071 0.2799 0.7513 0.9816 0.1850 0.3577
(0.266) (0.031) (0.022) (0.029) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.172) (0.000)
A/K -0.1134 -0.0783 -0.0029 -0.2122 -0.5731 0.0168 3.2152 -1.4354 -0.4561 -0.2293
(0.747) (0.753) (0.988) (0.499) (0.031) (0.949) (0.000) (0.015) (0.191) (0.281)
ADUM 0.3142 0.3248 0.0394 -0.0246 0.1713 0.1784 -0.1441 0.5708 -0.1355 0.2482
(0.002) (0.000) (0.658) (0.813) (0.122) (0.188) (0.549) (0.046) (0.354) (0.003)
SIG -23.2821 38.9042 -145.4754 -86.9164 -101.2366 -41.1075 271.3114 110.3547 77.9707 -148.4688
(0.349) (0.603) (0.083) (0.124) (0.160) (0.554) (0.000) (0.347) (0.118) (0.000)
SDUM 0.1587 0.2007 0.2387 0.1194 0.2265 0.3239 0.2611 0.7112 0.2662 0.5911
(0.107) (0.025) (0.004) (0.169) (0.045) (0.035) (0.362) (0.103) (0.381) (0.022)
LTDUM -0.3092 -0.3722 -0.0141 -0.0556 -0.4053 0.0014 0.0428 -0.1427 -0.3372 0.0096
(0.211) (0.071) (0.949) (0.796) (0.086) (0.996) (0.920) (0.813) (0.257) (0.948)
HTDUM 0.1097 0.0780 0.0160 0.0186 -0.1089 -0.0433 0.0722 -0.2837 -0.0258 0.2147
(0.261) (0.304) (0.826) (0.801) (0.216) (0.706) (0.714) (0.250) (0.844) (0.004)
LN(INS) 0.0020 0.1737 0.0139 0.0180 0.1313 0.1412 0.2095 0.4084 0.2195 0.1187
(0.988) (0.196) (0.721) (0.424) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INSDUM -0.0633 -1.5670 -0.0720 -0.0879 -1.9182 -2.1158 -3.5553 -5.9390 -3.2925 -1.9050
(0.957) (0.251) (0.850) (0.744) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CashSF -0.0020 -0.0044 -0.0173 -0.8986 -0.0129 -0.0480 -0.0379 -0.0322 -0.0192 -0.0064
(0.838) (0.534) (0.120) (0.000) (0.187) (0.000) (0.061) (0.162) (0.208) (0.236)
IntBD 15.3772 29.0661 17.9143 -0.0016 36.9503 48.2395 67.3298 139.3481 43.1701 20.4870
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.774) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
N 505 753 852 925 1131 1187 1257 1282 1220 1009
Adj R sq 0.3410 0.3690 0.2182 0.3503 0.3585 0.2462 0.2062 0.3800 0.2830 0.3636
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appendix 8: Analyses of the Relationship Between Single Year Executive Stock Option
Grants (EX ) and Firm Performance (Q ) using Cross-Sectional Data
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional data. Intercept terms
are included for all regressions, but not reported. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the explanatory
variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable definitions for the
acronyms are presented in Table 1, except for LN(EX) , which is defined as the natural logarithm of EX , where
EX is the average value of single year executive stock options granted to the firm's top five executives during the
fiscal year and [LN(EX)]^2  is the square term of LN(EX) .
Variables Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects
LN(EX) -2.8695 -2.0876 -1.5551 -1.7399 -0.8513 -0.4247
(0.476) (0.426) (0.439) (0.419) (0.443) (0.383)
[LN(EX)]^2 0.1210 0.0891 0.0636 0.0757 0.0363 0.0172
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
LN(S) 0.3537 4.7003 0.2577 -3.4506 2.1709 -1.2749
(0.519) (0.873) (1.325) (0.457) (1.042) (1.310)
[LN(S)]^2 -0.0126 -0.1198 -0.0129 0.0724 -0.0605 0.0163
(0.012) (0.022) (0.032) (0.011) (0.026) (0.031)
K/S -0.1334 -0.3440 -0.1737 -0.2171 -0.8389 -1.0067
(0.113) (0.277) (0.324) (0.084) (0.246) (0.238)
(K/S)^2 0.0072 0.0427 0.0086 0.0119 0.0841 0.0952
(0.025) (0.040) (0.041) (0.016) (0.030) (0.029)
EBIT/S -0.0020 0.0038 -0.0173 -0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0057
(0.006) (0.005) (0.022) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
I/K 2.2758 -0.2122 0.7277 3.0554 1.1381 -0.2778
(0.576) (0.553) (0.641) (0.437) (0.453) (0.452)
RD/K 1.2605 -0.2945 0.3352 0.1494 -0.0227 -0.8515
(0.238) (0.348) (0.725) (0.069) (0.060) (0.332)
RDUM 0.3928 0.1395 0.3957 0.5621 0.6217 -0.0558
(0.095) (0.288) (0.317) (0.074) (0.275) (0.202)
A/K -1.2698 2.0792 0.4101 -0.6177 0.3390 0.4217
(0.483) (1.298) (1.304) (0.163) (0.449) (0.287)
ADUM 0.1589 -0.3913 -0.1149 0.1774 0.1316 -0.2222
(0.111) (0.148) (0.140) (0.086) (0.174) (0.162)
SIG -1.0048 2.0786 0.9613 -82.3186 -276.1331 -84.0916
(32.008) (25.705) (20.242) (40.694) (39.748) (32.532)
SDUM 0.2859 0.3875 0.2457 0.2119 -0.2591 0.1023
(0.160) (0.210) (0.200) (0.167) (0.214) (0.244)
LTDUM -0.0225 -0.1587 -0.2166 -0.1031 -0.1597 -0.0645
(0.229) (0.179) (0.165) (0.167) (0.138) (0.150)
HTDUM 0.0417 0.0960 -0.0583 0.0465 0.1102 0.0284
(0.093) (0.081) (0.076) (0.073) (0.073) (0.061)
LN(INS) 0.0979 0.0509 0.0491 0.2220 0.1292 0.0662
(0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016)
INSDUM -1.3230 -0.6036 -0.4910 -3.1404 -2.0000 -1.5378
(0.333) (0.266) (0.242) (0.358) (0.481) (0.377)
CashSF -1.2712 -0.4048 -0.4737 -2.3480 -1.0200 -0.9126
(0.293) (0.281) (0.313) (0.227) (0.215) (0.213)
IntBD 0.0116 0.0118 0.0293 -0.0026 -0.0007 -0.0008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
N 83 83 83 409 409 409
Adj R sq 0.3859 0.6747 0.5517 0.4082 0.7274 0.6378
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appendix 9: Analyses of the Relationship Between Single Year Stock Option Grants
(EX ) and Firm Performance (Q ) using Pooled and Panel Data
For Period 1992 to 2001 For Period 1997 to 2001
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for the period 1992 to 2001 and 1997 to 2001 using the pooled and panel data.
Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Fixed effects at the firm or industry level
are included where indicated, but not reported. For the period 1992 to 2001 and the period 1997 to 2001, a
total of 58 and 144 SIC3 industry constants are recorded respectively. The estimated coefficients for the
explanatory variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses are reported.
Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1, except for LN(EX), which is defined as the
natural logarithm of EX, where EX is the average value of single year executive stock options granted to the
firm's top five executives during the fiscal year and [LN(EX)]^2 is the square term of LN(EX).
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
^LN(EX) -5.4231 -21.5791 -19.2168 -44.9493 49.0488 9.4058 -38.7862 -150.9625 -92.8393 -8.6097
(0.564) (0.025) (0.168) (0.326) (0.208) (0.411) (0.005) (0.057) (0.180) (0.233)
^[LN(EX)]^2 0.2064 0.8547 0.7415 1.7629 -1.8892 -0.3785 1.4380 5.4980 3.3432 0.2983
(0.591) (0.030) (0.176) (0.330) (0.202) (0.385) (0.006) (0.058) (0.181) (0.251)
K/S -0.3868 -0.1979 -0.3243 -0.6103 0.0782 -0.4527 -0.2749 1.3920 -0.7160 -0.2569
(0.001) (0.025) (0.042) (0.268) (0.866) (0.018) (0.372) (0.079) (0.162) (0.072)
(K/S)^2 0.0594 0.0029 0.0529 0.1049 -0.0026 0.0791 0.0362 -0.1308 0.0455 0.0207
(0.004) (0.039) (0.078) (0.243) (0.972) (0.060) (0.459) (0.230) (0.313) (0.558)
EBIT/S 0.0326 0.0251 0.0144 0.0377 -0.0770 0.1532 0.0498 -0.0406 0.1013 -0.0009
(0.018) (0.431) (0.552) (0.409) (0.246) (0.000) (0.264) (0.716) (0.262) (0.966)
I/K 2.1598 4.0785 1.4163 0.6671 7.6732 1.1463 10.3179 15.0901 -0.4126 2.4384
(0.003) (0.000) (0.054) (0.845) (0.002) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.838) (0.002)
RD/K 1.0366 0.4988 1.5278 2.1419 1.2815 1.0195 -0.5136 2.5074 -0.1353 0.5922
(0.001) (0.154) (0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.000) (0.026) (0.048) (0.916) (0.000)
RDUM 0.1614 0.5565 0.3587 0.8251 -0.1284 0.3354 1.4765 2.2145 0.7034 0.5037
(0.201) (0.007) (0.045) (0.246) (0.819) (0.070) (0.000) (0.026) (0.234) (0.000)
A/K -0.1211 -0.4326 0.1415 1.1707 1.5727 0.0401 2.9121 -0.0041 2.0285 -0.3614
(0.787) (0.438) (0.707) (0.545) (0.421) (0.904) (0.002) (0.999) (0.401) (0.179)
ADUM 0.3409 0.2582 -0.0159 -0.4692 0.1920 0.3647 -0.1765 -1.0458 -1.0507 0.2942
(0.213) (0.265) (0.936) (0.507) (0.722) (0.036) (0.648) (0.450) (0.297) (0.007)
LTDUM -0.1825 -1.3065 0.1551 0.8371 -0.0809 -0.0474 0.2876 -0.1923 1.7035 0.0891
(0.628) (0.059) (0.741) (0.486) (0.942) (0.897) (0.664) (0.927) (0.399) (0.666)
HTDUM 0.1569 -0.1422 -0.0429 0.2610 0.1392 -0.1010 0.1436 -1.3731 0.1213 0.1572
(0.228) (0.418) (0.759) (0.550) (0.792) (0.615) (0.652) (0.156) (0.838) (0.131)
LN(INS) 0.1344 -0.1364 -0.0359 0.1332 0.1068 0.1920 0.2919 0.3921 0.4140 0.2532
(0.498) (0.659) (0.671) (0.303) (0.427) (0.000) (0.008) (0.218) (0.037) (0.000)
INSDUM -1.1775 1.5664 0.4932 -1.4023 -1.9980 -3.0202 -5.0215 -4.8401 -5.8505 -3.9140
(0.479) (0.617) (0.577) (0.348) (0.292) (0.000) (0.003) (0.340) (0.061) (0.000)
CashSF -2.4698 -0.7802 -0.6701 -1.0519 -3.0990 -0.8609 -0.7610 -0.0792 -4.2591 -2.5093
(0.000) (0.083) (0.039) (0.203) (0.059) (0.020) (0.408) (0.968) (0.019) (0.000)
IntBD -0.0360 -0.0160 -0.0266 -0.0292 0.0099 -0.0756 -0.0384 -0.0466 -0.0858 -0.0123
(0.280) (0.324) (0.204) (0.389) (0.852) (0.000) (0.230) (0.559) (0.278) (0.081)
N 505 753 852 925 1131 1187 1257 1282 1220 1009
Adj R sq -0.0802 -2.0467 -1.8257 -10.6728 -12.4911 -0.1853 -0.9003 -6.4317 -11.5654 -0.0275
Appendix 10: Panel A - Analyses of the Relationship Between Single Year Executive
Stock Option Grants (EX ) and Firm Performance (Q ) Using Cross-Sectional Data
With Instrumental Variables 
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional data with
instrumental variables. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Instrumental variables
are LN(S), [LN(S)]2, SIG and SDUM. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the explanatory
variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable definitions for the
acronyms are presented in Table 1, except for ^LN(CEX) and ^[LN(CEX)]^2, which represent the estimated
LN(CEX) and [LN(CEX)]^2 variables.
Variables Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects
^LN(EX) -1.1182 0.0206 -0.0959 -1.7736 -0.4155 -0.8048
(1.943) (0.092) (0.091) (1.216) (0.103) (0.113)
^[LN(EX)]^2 0.0351 0.0600 -0.1108 0.0496 -1.4965 -0.4354
(0.071) (0.080) (0.089) (0.043) (0.193) (0.271)
K/S -0.1247 -0.7689 0.0770 -0.1672 -1.0027 -1.0225
(0.117) (0.273) (0.324) (0.088) (0.244) (0.239)
(K/S)^2 0.0097 0.0995 -0.0200 0.0086 0.0920 0.0934
(0.026) (0.040) (0.041) (0.017) (0.030) (0.029)
EBIT/S -0.0040 0.0005 -0.0156 0.0135 -0.0030 -0.0063
(0.006) (0.005) (0.022) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
I/K 2.7525 -0.5904 1.0636 5.2438 1.5086 -0.1900
(0.585) (0.565) (0.638) (0.420) (0.452) (0.453)
RD/K 1.8105 -0.7883 0.2906 0.4008 -0.0212 -0.7262
(0.195) (0.351) (0.732) (0.071) (0.060) (0.326)
RDUM 0.3726 0.0899 0.2356 0.8065 0.5624 -0.0178
(0.099) (0.298) (0.316) (0.076) (0.275) (0.202)
A/K -1.6235 2.2807 0.3600 -0.8939 -0.9558 0.0902
(0.484) (1.345) (1.310) (0.169) (0.477) (0.295)
ADUM 0.2813 -0.4054 -0.0876 0.2887 0.2095 -0.2072
(0.113) (0.154) (0.141) (0.090) (0.175) (0.161)
LTDUM -0.0145 -0.1178 -0.2113 -0.1349 -0.0867 0.0144
(0.239) (0.186) (0.167) (0.176) (0.138) (0.148)
HTDUM 0.0575 0.1112 -0.0640 0.0162 0.1112 0.0285
(0.097) (0.085) (0.077) (0.077) (0.072) (0.061)
LN(INS) 0.1545 0.0658 0.0591 0.2498 0.1484 0.0691
(0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016)
INSDUM -1.9613 -0.7425 -0.6355 -3.4804 -2.0631 -1.4611
(0.336) (0.275) (0.244) (0.360) (0.481) (0.373)
CashSF -1.5223 -0.7110 -0.5117 -2.2791 -1.1617 -0.8790
(0.304) (0.288) (0.316) (0.239) (0.214) (0.214)
IntBD 0.0142 0.0176 0.0354 -0.0071 0.0002 -0.0008
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
N 83 83 83 409 409 409
Adj R sq 0.3345 0.7276 0.6112 0.3402 0.7378 0.6643
For Period 1992 to 2001 For Period 1997 to 2001
Appendix 10: Panel B - Analyses of the Relationship Between Single Year Executive
Stock Option Grants (EX ) and Firm Performance (Q ) using Pooled and Panel Data
With Instrumental Variables
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for the period 1992 to 2001 and 1997 to 2001 using the pooled and panel data with
instrumental variables. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Instrumental variables
are LN(S), [LN(S)]2, SIG and SDUM. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the explanatory
variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable definitions for the
acronyms are presented in Table 1, except for ^LN(CEX) and ^[LN(CEX)]^2, which represent estimated
LN(CEX) and [LN(CEX)]^2 variables.
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
LN(S) -1.2682 -0.6431 -0.9937 -1.4560 -0.6287 -1.8568 -1.6345 -1.1162 -0.4162 -0.1192
(0.073) (0.339) (0.139) (0.015) (0.236) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.405) (0.823)
[LN(S)]^2 0.0340 0.0194 0.0283 0.0407 0.0218 0.0499 0.0446 0.0312 0.0152 0.0079
(0.046) (0.229) (0.078) (0.004) (0.084) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.194) (0.524)
K/S -0.4719 -0.2068 -0.4120 -0.2696 -0.4671 -0.6445 -0.3432 -0.1825 -0.1832 -0.2809
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.003) (0.015)
(K/S)^2 0.0416 0.0029 0.0359 0.0117 0.0479 0.0811 0.0222 0.0197 0.0175 0.0525
(0.045) (0.001) (0.082) (0.449) (0.006) (0.000) (0.082) (0.030) (0.004) (0.062)
EBIT/S 0.0101 -0.0067 0.0152 0.0229 0.0069 0.0167 0.0173 0.0049 0.0017 -0.0045
(0.547) (0.771) (0.489) (0.150) (0.546) (0.208) (0.148) (0.622) (0.876) (0.770)
I/K 3.3495 3.4055 3.6448 4.0893 2.4894 0.9554 3.0948 2.5780 0.8246 1.7741
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
RD/K -0.1576 -0.1367 0.4528 0.4518 0.2139 0.1703 -0.0491 0.4269 0.2765 0.2090
(0.574) (0.578) (0.114) (0.079) (0.085) (0.156) (0.421) (0.001) (0.008) (0.055)
RDUM -0.2409 -0.2575 -0.2539 -0.2759 -0.2177 -0.2879 -0.1139 -0.0636 -0.2147 0.0097
(0.097) (0.033) (0.027) (0.010) (0.019) (0.001) (0.158) (0.452) (0.010) (0.906)
A/K -0.6398 -0.4312 0.2173 0.6623 0.2305 0.1714 0.5167 -0.1636 0.1217 -0.2304
(0.216) (0.274) (0.513) (0.143) (0.435) (0.399) (0.043) (0.400) (0.569) (0.298)
ADUM 0.4289 0.3470 -0.0120 -0.2841 -0.1215 -0.0612 -0.0871 0.0310 -0.0799 0.1162
(0.004) (0.006) (0.936) (0.058) (0.324) (0.563) (0.385) (0.742) (0.372) (0.181)
SIG 0.4118 1.7023 -3.4598 -1.0015 0.4456 -0.1259 -0.0377 0.3578 0.2660 -0.4085
(0.267) (0.149) (0.014) (0.219) (0.578) (0.816) (0.882) (0.344) (0.374) (0.252)
SDUM 0.1360 -0.0173 0.2663 0.1758 0.0724 0.0524 0.1179 0.2271 0.4124 0.4823
(0.349) (0.902) (0.054) (0.160) (0.565) (0.662) (0.323) (0.111) (0.027) (0.073)
LTDUM 0.2710 -0.1960 0.0940 -0.0951 -0.4748 -0.2718 -0.2565 -0.0593 -0.0492 -0.1059
(0.456) (0.547) (0.797) (0.759) (0.071) (0.196) (0.151) (0.765) (0.787) (0.492)
HTDUM 0.1498 0.1028 -0.0137 0.1412 -0.1419 -0.0384 -0.0583 -0.0562 -0.0913 0.0398
(0.297) (0.393) (0.911) (0.186) (0.147) (0.668) (0.478) (0.487) (0.257) (0.609)
LN(INS) 0.4365 0.3252 0.0158 0.0104 0.1432 0.1786 0.2459 0.3308 0.3193 0.2634
(0.032) (0.127) (0.809) (0.748) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INSDUM -2.5532 -2.7073 -0.1196 0.1010 -1.9894 -2.6578 -3.5987 -4.8722 -4.6375 -3.9162
(0.143) (0.211) (0.852) (0.794) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CashSF -1.0592 -1.1223 -0.9927 -0.7980 -1.7391 -1.4235 -1.1047 -0.8467 -1.2705 -0.5783
(0.031) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017)
IntBD 0.0014 -0.0007 0.0023 -0.0077 -0.0028 -0.0190 -0.0169 -0.0045 -0.0219 -0.0128
(0.919) (0.949) (0.902) (0.340) (0.799) (0.066) (0.045) (0.551) (0.019) (0.021)
N 505 753 852 852 1131 1187 1257 1282 1220 1009
Adj R sq 0.1637 0.1449 0.1290 0.1537 0.2109 0.2067 0.2801 0.3328 0.3590 0.2988
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appendix 11: Analyses of the Determinants of Total Equity Grants (ST_CEX ) Using
Cross-Sectional Data
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of total equity grants, ST_CEX, on the
explanatory variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional data.
ST_CEX is defined as the average value sum of stock and stock options granted to the firm's top five
executives. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. This table reports the estimated
coefficients for the explanatory variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses.
Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1.
Variables Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects
LN(S) -2.0853 -0.5571 -2.5229 -1.1230 -1.1777 -0.2557
(0.524) (0.536) (1.072) (0.368) (0.396) (1.368)
[LN(S)]^2 0.0520 0.0233 0.0688 0.0314 0.0330 0.0088
(0.012) (0.013) (0.026) (0.009) (0.009) (0.032)
K/S -0.2853 -0.4569 -0.4108 -0.2240 -0.2274 -0.1573
(0.116) (0.170) (0.258) (0.068) (0.073) (0.252)
(K/S)^2 0.0204 0.0559 0.0445 0.0047 0.0009 0.0206
(0.025) (0.024) (0.032) (0.013) (0.014) (0.030)
EBIT/S -0.0003 0.0038 0.0098 0.0036 0.0013 -0.0002
(0.006) (0.003) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
I/K 2.3796 0.3249 0.5817 2.7540 2.9724 0.0334
(0.582) (0.341) (0.516) (0.351) (0.375) (0.485)
RD/K 0.3153 -0.0812 2.1883 0.0195 0.0474 -0.3214
(0.232) (0.215) (0.765) (0.056) (0.061) (0.973)
RDUM -0.1629 -0.5097 -0.3655 -0.1039 -0.0775 -0.2666
(0.097) (0.179) (0.204) (0.059) (0.065) (0.211)
A/K 1.2815 1.3595 1.3995 0.2425 0.2603 -0.0608
(0.493) (0.808) (1.038) (0.132) (0.142) (1.019)
ADUM 0.3444 -0.2680 -0.3384 -0.0015 -0.0755 0.1578
(0.112) (0.092) (0.117) (0.069) (0.073) (0.177)
SIG 50.3689 22.8026 20.1226 20.3256 32.1472 -88.1216
(32.685) (16.000) (16.161) (32.037) (35.817) (34.494)
SDUM -0.2603 -0.1813 -0.3642 0.0814 -0.0452 -0.0304
(0.164) (0.130) (0.158) (0.136) (0.148) (0.209)
LTDUM -0.2693 0.0924 -0.0282 -0.1741 -0.0978 -0.1617
(0.235) (0.111) (0.135) (0.135) (0.147) (0.173)
HTDUM 0.1635 -0.0022 -0.0496 -0.0163 0.0544 -0.0233
(0.095) (0.051) (0.062) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063)
LN(INS) 0.1645 0.0661 0.0620 0.3001 0.2924 0.0650
(0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
INSDUM -1.6187 -0.3964 -0.3403 -4.5161 -4.1915 -1.2410
(0.331) (0.164) (0.191) (0.280) (0.303) (0.394)
CashSF -0.8366 -0.6050 -0.4689 -0.3646 -0.3011 -0.5649
(0.298) (0.174) (0.253) (0.184) (0.197) (0.222)
IntBD 0.0041 0.0009 -0.0043 -0.0047 -0.0029 0.0122
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
N 83.000 83.000 83.000 409.000 409.000 409.000
Adj R sq 0.3165 0.8034 0.7312 0.3248 0.8008 0.6091
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
For Period 1992 to 2001 For Period 1997 to 2001
Appendix 12: Analyses of the Determinants of Total Equity Grants (ST_CEX ) Using
Pooled and Panel Data
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of total equity , ST_CEX, on the explanatory
variables indicated below for the period 1992 to 2001 and 1997 to 2001 using the pooled and panel data.
ST_CEX is defined as the average value sum of stock and stock options granted to the firm's top five
executives. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Fixed effects at the firm or
industry level are included where indicated, but not reported. For the period 1992 to 2001 and the period 1997
to 2001, a total of 58 and 144 SIC3 industry constants are recorded respectively. The estimated coefficients for
the explanatory variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses are reported.
Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1.
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
LN(ST_CEX) -0.6256 -0.4230 -0.1268 -0.3268 -0.1801 0.9059 -5.3311 -5.9767 -2.4119 0.1515
(0.108) (0.160) (0.617) (0.225) (0.542) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.714)
[LN(ST_CEX)]^2 0.0258 0.0187 0.0085 0.0162 0.0137 -0.0185 0.1869 0.2024 0.0920 0.0051
(0.045) (0.058) (0.309) (0.064) (0.146) (0.210) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.692)
LN(S) -1.2795 -2.4218 -1.0294 -1.7360 -2.6634 -3.6048 -5.0891 -11.4275 -3.0110 -1.0934
(0.006) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030)
[LN(S)]^2 0.0283 0.0533 0.0214 0.0368 0.0558 0.0788 0.1146 0.2613 0.0635 0.0209
(0.012) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.074)
K/S -0.3026 -0.1315 -0.1645 -0.0437 -0.0960 -0.1681 0.0455 0.6112 -0.2524 -0.2292
(0.001) (0.000) (0.014) (0.508) (0.265) (0.196) (0.807) (0.002) (0.008) (0.034)
(K/S)^2 0.0450 0.0011 0.0213 0.0075 -0.0029 0.0295 -0.0224 -0.0629 0.0045 0.0075
(0.001) (0.035) (0.078) (0.471) (0.846) (0.253) (0.444) (0.020) (0.636) (0.777)
EBIT/S 0.0146 -0.0108 0.0040 -0.0033 -0.0444 0.0995 0.0305 -0.0321 0.0001 -0.0142
(0.186) (0.444) (0.754) (0.758) (0.000) (0.000) (0.263) (0.280) (0.997) (0.330)
I/K 0.4739 1.3692 0.7120 1.3827 2.4642 0.4595 5.4320 13.0588 -0.1791 1.5691
(0.334) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.111) (0.000) (0.000) (0.631) (0.000)
RD/K 0.7996 0.1742 0.9009 1.5541 0.3781 0.1512 -0.4622 1.4594 0.6761 0.3119
(0.000) (0.249) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.313) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
RDUM 0.1541 0.2126 0.1949 0.2221 0.3680 0.3738 0.8932 1.0643 0.4124 0.4293
(0.109) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
A/K -0.0554 -0.0913 -0.0383 -0.3591 -0.5983 -0.0221 2.5497 -1.6091 -0.5129 -0.1912
(0.872) (0.707) (0.844) (0.241) (0.020) (0.931) (0.000) (0.005) (0.120) (0.359)
ADUM 0.2627 0.2982 0.0607 0.0290 0.2236 0.2205 -0.1017 0.5776 -0.0690 0.2474
(0.008) (0.000) (0.486) (0.774) (0.037) (0.095) (0.657) (0.038) (0.618) (0.002)
SIG -0.2598 0.3915 -0.8920 -0.7419 -0.8672 -0.0653 2.5744 0.8845 0.9425 -0.7351
(0.290) (0.591) (0.280) (0.177) (0.213) (0.923) (0.000) (0.431) (0.042) (0.028)
SDUM 0.1308 0.1721 0.1858 0.0742 0.1906 0.2583 0.2265 0.6218 0.0178 0.3050
(0.172) (0.047) (0.022) (0.378) (0.081) (0.084) (0.407) (0.142) (0.951) (0.227)
LTDUM -0.3168 -0.3000 -0.0475 -0.0121 -0.2914 0.0605 0.1390 -0.1018 -0.3401 0.0290
(0.187) (0.134) (0.824) (0.954) (0.204) (0.817) (0.734) (0.862) (0.227) (0.841)
HTDUM 0.0859 0.0477 0.0140 0.0018 -0.0985 -0.0476 0.0819 -0.2606 -0.0068 0.1487
(0.366) (0.521) (0.844) (0.980) (0.247) (0.670) (0.663) (0.277) (0.957) (0.042)
LN(INS) -0.0670 0.1118 0.0166 0.0205 0.1058 0.1014 0.0949 0.2799 0.1124 0.0819
(0.620) (0.394) (0.665) (0.347) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INSDUM 0.2840 -1.0063 -0.1222 -0.1578 -1.5982 -1.5524 -1.9143 -4.0612 -1.7156 -1.4322
(0.806) (0.451) (0.744) (0.544) (0.000) (0.001) (0.025) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
CashSF -2.3231 -0.9950 -0.4893 -0.7752 -0.9176 -0.2943 -1.6472 -0.9703 -2.1975 -2.3466
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.285) (0.002) (0.083) (0.000) (0.000)
IntBD -0.0046 -0.0048 -0.0185 -0.0004 -0.0134 -0.0463 -0.0316 -0.0302 -0.0105 -0.0042
(0.622) (0.482) (0.089) (0.944) (0.159) (0.000) (0.102) (0.178) (0.469) (0.428)
N 505 753 852 852 1131 1187 1257 1282 1220 1009
Adj R sq 0.3766 0.3992 0.2485 0.3882 0.3969 0.2826 0.2782 0.4117 0.3550 0.3934
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appendix 13: Analyses of the Relationship Between Total Equity Grants (ST_CEX ) and
Firm Performance (Q ) Using Cross-Sectional Data
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional data. Intercept terms
are included for all regressions, but not reported. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the explanatory
variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable definitions for the
acronyms are presented in Table 1, except for LN(ST_CEX), which is defined as the natural logarithm of
ST_CEX, where ST_CEX is the average value sum of stock and stock options granted to the firm's top five
executives and [LN(ST_CEX)]^2 is the square term of LN(ST_CEX).
Variables Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects
LN(ST_CEX) -1.4296 -3.4470 -3.5870 0.2770 0.1499 -0.8011
(0.479) (0.538) (0.494) (0.343) (0.383) (0.388)
[LN(ST_CEX)]^2 0.0551 0.1362 0.1368 0.0030 0.0067 0.0398
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
LN(S) 0.7939 4.0568 2.1625 -3.3373 -3.5287 -1.6676
(0.511) (0.763) (1.143) (0.445) (0.494) (1.143)
[LN(S)]^2 -0.0213 -0.1086 -0.0634 0.0704 0.0753 0.0257
(0.012) (0.019) (0.028) (0.011) (0.012) (0.027)
K/S -0.0756 -0.3943 -0.1603 -0.1304 -0.0686 -0.8093
(0.112) (0.243) (0.277) (0.082) (0.091) (0.210)
(K/S)^2 0.0091 0.0482 0.0062 0.0095 -0.0035 0.0713
(0.024) (0.035) (0.035) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025)
EBIT/S -0.0035 0.0021 -0.0174 -0.0015 0.0040 0.0044
(0.006) (0.004) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
I/K 1.9181 -0.3155 0.4998 2.4017 2.3118 -0.2342
(0.566) (0.487) (0.548) (0.430) (0.477) (0.406)
RD/K 1.6640 -0.3176 -0.6510 0.1913 0.1870 -0.3933
(0.225) (0.307) (0.819) (0.068) (0.076) (0.813)
RDUM 0.4567 0.1703 0.2184 0.6791 0.6805 0.0641
(0.095) (0.257) (0.217) (0.072) (0.081) (0.177)
A/K -2.2518 0.6265 -1.5990 -0.6903 -0.5275 1.7336
(0.487) (1.151) (1.107) (0.159) (0.177) (0.852)
ADUM 0.1978 -0.1296 0.0764 0.2325 0.1714 -0.2947
(0.109) (0.132) (0.126) (0.083) (0.091) (0.149)
SIG 0.1792 -4.1631 -2.6207 -5.2201 14.5172 -39.3102
(31.515) (22.767) (17.157) (38.640) (44.514) (28.999)
SDUM 0.2185 0.2142 0.1778 0.1391 0.0503 0.0872
(0.159) (0.186) (0.170) (0.164) (0.184) (0.174)
LTDUM 0.0723 -0.2055 -0.2536 -0.0605 -0.0128 0.0291
(0.226) (0.159) (0.143) (0.163) (0.183) (0.145)
HTDUM -0.0151 0.0884 -0.0813 0.0534 -0.0034 0.0194
(0.092) (0.072) (0.065) (0.071) (0.079) (0.053)
LN(INS) 0.1008 0.0065 0.0106 0.1679 0.1605 0.0497
(0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014)
INSDUM -1.4043 -0.2433 -0.1572 -2.3265 -2.3913 -1.1921
(0.324) (0.237) (0.205) (0.359) (0.398) (0.332)
CashSF -1.2854 -0.1736 -0.0980 -2.2938 -2.3476 -0.4835
(0.288) (0.249) (0.269) (0.222) (0.246) (0.187)
IntBD 0.0132 0.0137 0.0315 -0.0020 -0.0067 -0.0139
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
N 83 83 83 409 409 409
Adj R sq 0.403 0.7449 0.6716 0.4355 0.8208 0.7219
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Appendix 14: Analyses of the Relationship Between Total Equity Grants (ST_CEX ) 
and Firm Performance (Q ) Using Pooled and Panel Data
For Period 1992 to 2001 For Period 1997 to 2001
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for the period 1992 to 2001 and 1997 to 2001 using the pooled and panel data.
Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Fixed effects at the firm or industry level
are included where indicated, but not reported. For the period 1992 to 2001 and the period 1997 to 2001, a
total of 58 and 144 SIC3 industry constants are recorded respectively. The estimated coefficients for the
explanatory variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses are reported.
Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented in Table 1, except for LN(ST_CEX), which is defined
as the natural logarithm of ST_CEX, where ST_CEX is the average value sum of stock and stock options
granted to the firm's top five executives and [LN(ST_CEX)]^2 is the square term of LN(ST_CEX).
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
^LN(ST_CEX) -23.0575 4.0275 -15.0767 1.3788 -70.6427 -60.2195 -94.4960 -110.3973 -28.0841 -8.3894
(0.135) (0.584) (0.040) (0.783) (0.397) (0.033) (0.012) (0.004) (0.016) (0.102)
^[LN(ST_CEX)]^2 0.7785 -0.1567 0.4858 -0.0551 2.2346 1.8956 3.0080 3.4982 0.8704 0.2545
(0.136) (0.526) (0.043) (0.735) (0.402) (0.034) (0.012) (0.004) (0.019) (0.118)
K/S -0.7299 -0.2139 -0.3523 -0.2039 -1.0071 -1.5991 -1.3626 0.1133 -0.2175 -0.3842
(0.069) (0.014) (0.047) (0.022) (0.278) (0.037) (0.101) (0.867) (0.300) (0.008)
(K/S)^2 0.1134 0.0032 0.0329 0.0315 0.0431 0.2795 0.0500 -0.1095 0.0005 0.0409
(0.046) (0.028) (0.253) (0.017) (0.698) (0.041) (0.615) (0.220) (0.980) (0.242)
EBIT/S 0.0417 0.0128 0.0286 0.0286 0.0189 0.2037 0.0157 0.0576 0.0233 -0.0089
(0.155) (0.634) (0.324) (0.035) (0.821) (0.002) (0.866) (0.508) (0.443) (0.639)
I/K 0.2528 5.6096 2.5225 3.6663 0.1187 2.8701 4.6757 16.1309 1.6724 2.4128
(0.911) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.986) (0.036) (0.245) (0.000) (0.016) (0.00001)
RD/K 1.2268 0.4249 1.6742 2.0781 1.3552 0.9606 0.8372 3.6216 1.1910 0.5571
(0.019) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.128) (0.079) (0.207) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
RDUM 0.4289 -0.0190 0.4003 0.0666 0.9040 1.7689 1.8841 1.8850 0.8200 0.5220
(0.226) (0.931) (0.070) (0.567) (0.383) (0.036) (0.008) (0.019) (0.017) (0.000)
A/K -1.3497 -0.0582 -1.2461 0.1229 -3.9700 -2.3745 -2.7697 -5.1158 -0.2587 -0.5306
(0.297) (0.932) (0.122) (0.861) (0.400) (0.126) (0.350) (0.013) (0.672) (0.089)
ADUM 0.2394 0.6114 0.3933 -0.1080 -0.4478 1.1361 -0.4731 0.5426 -0.2907 0.3223
(0.529) (0.002) (0.144) (0.406) (0.664) (0.091) (0.542) (0.533) (0.279) (0.003)
LTDUM -0.0065 -0.6050 0.4830 -0.0652 -1.4162 -0.0250 -0.7463 -0.2486 -0.2684 -0.0304
(0.993) (0.168) (0.381) (0.818) (0.451) (0.981) (0.599) (0.892) (0.608) (0.873)
HTDUM -0.1985 0.1948 0.0401 -0.0104 -0.5131 -0.4040 -0.1886 -0.2160 0.0023 0.2105
(0.564) (0.360) (0.813) (0.932) (0.460) (0.377) (0.765) (0.773) (0.992) (0.030)
LN(INS) -0.6843 0.4422 0.1367 0.0259 0.2444 0.3752 0.2935 0.1173 0.3872 0.2588
(0.294) (0.181) (0.211) (0.358) (0.241) (0.048) (0.333) (0.817) (0.004) (0.000)
INSDUM 3.6074 -3.8904 -1.3170 -0.1032 -4.0135 -6.3501 -4.9832 -1.3614 -4.8677 -4.0069
(0.408) (0.234) (0.224) (0.759) (0.198) (0.037) (0.272) (0.856) (0.020) (0.000)
CashSF -2.5814 -1.6456 -1.6590 -0.9994 -7.3218 -5.4745 -5.6705 -3.6035 -4.3906 -2.7132
(0.010) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.242) (0.028) (0.020) (0.098) (0.000) (0.000)
IntBD 0.0039 -0.0016 -0.0227 -0.0086 -0.0076 -0.1319 -0.0669 -0.0357 -0.0275 -0.0157
(0.886) (0.903) (0.370) (0.215) (0.914) (0.028) (0.320) (0.613) (0.335) (0.034)
N 505 753 852 852 1131 1187 1257 1282 1220 1009
Adj R sq -4.1363 -1.2034 -3.2164 -0.0022 -30.5551 -10.3819 -7.0441 -4.6795 -1.1813 -0.0346
Appendix 15: Panel A - Analyses of the Relationship Between Total Equity Grants
(ST_CEX ) and Firm Performance (Q ) Using Cross-Sectional Data with Instrumental
Variables
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for each of the ten years (1992 to 2001) using the cross-sectional data with instrumental
variables. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Instrumental variables are LN(S),
[LN(S)]2, SIG and SDUM. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables and their
White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable definitions for the acronyms are presented
in Table 1, except for LN(ST_CEX), which is defined as the natural logarithm of ST_CEX, where ST_CEX is the
average value sum of stock and stock options granted to the firm's top five executives and [LN(ST_CEX)]^2 is
the square term of LN(ST_CEX).
Variables Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects Pooled Firm Effects SIC3 Effects
^LN(ST_CEX) -3.2020 -0.0457 -0.1555 -1.9764 -0.3386 -1.5760
(3.301) (0.122) (0.122) (3.800) (0.120) (0.490)
^[LN(ST_CEX)]^2 0.0918 0.1135 -0.2065 0.0477 0.1223 -7.7730
(0.102) (0.134) (0.167) (0.117) (0.146) (2.986)
K/S -0.1273 -0.8085 0.0173 -0.1566 -0.1444 -0.7912
(0.117) (0.274) (0.321) (0.088) (0.098) (0.249)
(K/S)^2 0.0110 0.1035 -0.0144 0.0078 0.0020 0.0751
(0.026) (0.040) (0.040) (0.017) (0.019) (0.030)
EBIT/S -0.0031 0.0001 -0.0122 0.0151 0.0190 0.0028
(0.006) (0.005) (0.023) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
I/K 2.8338 -0.6643 0.7844 5.2563 5.1694 -0.2132
(0.574) (0.567) (0.632) (0.423) (0.467) (0.481)
RD/K 1.8936 -0.8186 -0.0552 0.4061 0.4305 -0.1771
(0.189) (0.350) (0.950) (0.071) (0.079) (0.961)
RDUM 0.3696 0.0987 0.1191 0.8105 0.8254 -0.0933
(0.099) (0.298) (0.253) (0.076) (0.085) (0.208)
A/K -1.7124 2.2160 0.0322 -0.8782 -0.7599 1.7346
(0.481) (1.344) (1.287) (0.170) (0.188) (1.014)
ADUM 0.2999 -0.3942 -0.2071 0.2817 0.1786 -0.3718
(0.114) (0.153) (0.144) (0.090) (0.099) (0.175)
LTDUM -0.0231 -0.1218 -0.3023 -0.1367 -0.1064 0.0664
(0.239) (0.186) (0.169) (0.177) (0.198) (0.172)
HTDUM 0.0541 0.1097 -0.1059 0.0175 -0.0355 0.0297
(0.097) (0.085) (0.077) (0.077) (0.085) (0.063)
LN(INS) 0.1537 0.0692 0.0592 0.2448 0.2277 0.0707
(0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.016)
INSDUM -1.9686 -0.7605 -0.6407 -3.4027 -3.1954 -1.3326
(0.336) (0.275) (0.239) (0.362) (0.401) (0.386)
CashSF -1.5234 -0.7279 -0.4550 -2.2864 -2.3159 -0.8079
(0.303) (0.287) (0.315) (0.240) (0.265) (0.220)
IntBD 0.0145 0.0170 0.0330 -0.0074 -0.0111 -0.0066
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
N 83 83 83 409 409 409
Adj R sq 0.3332 0.698 0.6144 0.3371 0.7985 0.6402
For Period 1992 to 2001 For Period 1997 to 2001
Appendix 15: Panel B - Analyses of the Relationship Between Total Equity Grants
(ST_CEX ) and Firm Performance (Q ) Using Pooled and Panel Data with Instrumental
Variables
The specifications reported in this table model the regression of firm performance, Q , on the explanatory
variables indicated below for the period 1992 to 2001 and 1997 to 2001 using the pooled and panel data with
instrumental variables. Intercept terms are included for all regressions, but not reported. Instrumental variables
are LN(S), [LN(S)]2, SIG and SDUM. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the explanatory
variables and their White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value in parentheses. Variable definitions for the
acronyms are presented in Table 1, except for LN(ST_CEX), which is defined as the natural logarithm of
ST_CEX, where ST_CEX is the average value sum of stock and stock options granted to the firm's top five
executives and [LN(ST_CEX)]^2 is the square term of LN(ST_CEX).
